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Abstract 
 
This project offers a critical rhetorical history of “the nonprofit” over the last 50 
years of American political discourses.  The author explicates the value of genealogy and 
rhetorical history as methodologies in critical communication studies.  She then examines 
three discursive junctures. Beginning with Ronald Reagan’s public addresses and his 
deployment of the neoliberal epideictic, the author traces different rhetorical treatments 
of “the nonprofit.”  The author then examines the emergence of nonprofit watchdogging 
agencies in the 1990s, and discourses of surveillance and resistance that developed at this 
time.  Particular attention is paid to the discursive shifts surrounding September 11, 2001.   
The author discusses how rhetorical trends have conditioned contemporary 
conversations surrounding social service provision and social change, and the political 
implications of this current juncture.  Finally, the project addresses contemporary 
rhetorics of nonprofit resistance and the advocacy movement for “de-nonprofitization.” 
The author offers an archive to scholars and activists by presenting a history of “the 
nonprofit” as a centerpiece of American politics and American identities.   
	  




















































As I understand it, the nonprofit industrial complex is a set of symbiotic 
relationships that link together political and financial technologies of state and 
owning-class proctorship and surveillance over public political intercourse, 
including and especially emergent progressive and leftist social movements, since 
about the mid-1970s. (Rodriguez, 2008, p. 21-2) 
 As a young activist, I had experienced extraordinary frustration with the 
contradictions of the “social change workforce,” and I was compelled by the argument 
made in INCITE!’s (2008) anthology, The Revolution Will Not be Funded.  Its 
contributors offer that the nonprofit sector has evolved into something of an industrial 
complex and that the result has been a tangled wreck of neoliberal ideologies, capitalist 
activism and cultural appropriation.  I was excited by the evocative, oxymoronic pairing 
of “industrial complex” and “nonprofit,” a phrase born out of a war critique and a 
classification of tax exemption that I had imagined to be politically neutral. 
 I recognized the development of the phrase as a tactical choice and a rhetorical 
strategy (whether intentional or not).  I became interested in how it might be at once 
constructive and constraining to center this critique on such incongruity of terms and how 
this rhetorical strategy might resonate with different audiences.  This project is the result 
of these interests.  It is an attempt to trace a rhetorical history of American nonprofit 
discourses since the 1980s, such that it might enable a better understanding of 
contemporary conceptions of American charity and volunteerism.  Rather than exploring 
nonprofits as a legal or social structure, it considers how designations like “nonprofit,” 
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“volunteer,” and “charity,” have functioned discursively in the past 50 years of 
mainstream public discourse.   
Genealogical Inquiry 
“Herein we find an invaluable philosophical contribution: recognition that that 
which is conditioned can condition its own conditions.  Only one who does not take 
history seriously will find this paradoxical.  No doubt, many will” (Koopman, 2013, p. 
103).  The first chapter of this project offers a justification for a critical, historical 
approach to nonprofits.  Specifically, it outlines the tenets of rhetorical history and 
genealogical inquiry.  Based on the tenets of Foucauldian genealogy and rhetorical 
historiography, I argue that one can best understand the contemporary politics of 
American volunteerism and charity with an eye towards history.  As Koopman (2013) 
explains, “genealogy at its best involves a practice of critique in the form of the historical 
problematization of the present” (p. 2).  Furthermore, this project responds to Ashcraft 
and Trethewey’s (2004) call for historical inquiry, as put forth in their special issue 
synthesis on “tension” in organizational communication studies.  They explain:  
[C]lose examination of history – particularly, the conflicted histories of 
organizational, industrial, and occupational cultures – constitutes an important 
applied endeavor.  To better understand contemporary dilemmas, organizational 
communication practitioners and applied scholars would do well to conduct 
genealogies of discourse among professional, organizational, and market 
communities. (Ashcraft & Trethewey, 2004, p. 174) 
Ashcraft and Trethewey offer that an historical, discursive analysis might enable critical 
organizational communication scholarship.  While there is a large body of work that 
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examines nonprofits structurally, the discursive history of the “nonprofit” designation in 
relation to national understandings of American volunteerism is uncharted territory.   
In the following three chapters, I consider three junctures that are particularly 
significant to the evolving meaning of the American nonprofit.  They represent three 
distinct treatments of nonprofits and are not intended to represent a causal lineage.  
Rather, they represent three different treatments of nonprofits and the character of the 
American volunteer as they are culturally fixed on a national scale.  The first chapter 
examines President Ronald Reagan’s call for the reassignment of social service 
responsibilities from the federal government onto the nonprofit sector, which took place 
over the course of a series of addresses.  I classify Reagan’s treatment of American 
volunteerism as highly epideictic, and discuss how his casting of praise and blame 
conditioned the American public to a particular vocabulary for talking about nonprofit 
money and nonprofit work.  The second chapter addresses the emergence of nonprofit 
proctorship agencies in the 1990s, and their call for the public and/or private surveillance 
of the nonprofit sector.  I argue that the neoliberal and epideictic vocabularies of the 
1980s re-appeared in these conversations, and enabled a very particular (though 
contradictory) national understanding of what charity ought to be and be controlled by.  I 
argue further in this chapter that the attacks on 9/11 and the resulting boost in charitable 
donations (of blood, time, and money) changed the landscape of nonprofit work and 
nonprofit giving and intensified existing discursive trends having to do with the public’s 
duties to police nonprofits.  The third, and final chapter, addresses the contemporary 
moment – The mainstream celebration of a nonprofit sector that is larger in breadth and 
budget than ever, and the emergence of a largely overlooked de-nonprofitization 
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movement among activist scholars.  This chapter builds on the prior two chapters to 
engage a discussion about the rhetorical choices of nonprofit-critical activists, using the 
past as a prism for examining the present.  It asks how the de-nonprofitization movement 
has developed its own particular vocabulary, and how this vocabulary differs from more 
celebratory discourses.  Ultimately, I will speak to the constraints of the latter discourse 
over the former and argue that these arguments draw more effectively on historically 
situated vocabularies and ideological work tracing back fifty years.  At each of the three 
junctures considered in this project, I look to the assignment of praise and blame, the 
negotiation of responsibility, constructions of citizenship and civic duty, and the making 
of what American volunteerism means to the public. 
The project will be guided by three inquiries – one historical, one genealogical, 
and one implicative: 
1. How have the American nonprofit, the American charity and the American 
volunteer functioned rhetorically and ideographically at each of these three 
junctures, and how has the idea of what they are been discursively 
constructed in the last 50 years? 
2. What has the use of volunteer and nonprofit language enabled and 
constrained at each of these junctures?  How did these terms evolve in the 
context of power structures?  How did their use negotiate, resist, and 
reinforce existing power structures? 
3. What does a rhetorical history of these discourses tell us about the problems 
of the present?  What can activists make of this kind of archive? 
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While the American nonprofit has both legal and social structure, my argument 
centers on how the cultural meaning of the nonprofit has been rendered discursively, in 
relation to other charismatic terms, and how discursive actors have played the term 
“nonprofit” against ideographic language (“American spirit,” “investment,” “hero”) in 
order to project different meanings and different political agendas.  It is an exploration 
into how meaning emerges in the relationships between and among ideologically charged 
terms, and it is meant to address how the cultural meaning of the nonprofit has been 
constructed. 
Context 
Foucault’s (1977) genealogy of the prison, aptly subtitled “Naissance de la 
prison,” traces the prison from its birth to its modern form.  These bookends serve as his 
book’s infrastructure: How did “we” get from point A to point B?  As Foucault famously 
wrote, “less than a century separates them” (p. 7).  This project attends to a similarly 
dramatic shift in discourse and culture.  In the chapters that follow I show how the way 
political and activist leaders have talked about nonprofits has evolved dramatically over 
the past fifty years.  Additionally, I offer that the American nonprofit, and how it is and 
continues to be discursively positioned in the construction of national identity is of 
incredible relevance to scholars and practitioners of social change and social service 
provision.  In this chapter, I will situate the project by offering some political and 
historical context (beginning in the 1980s) and highlighting some points of tension. 
The American welfare system is made up of income support and direct services, 
the latter of which is primarily facilitated by nonprofit organizations (Marwell, 2004; 
Salamon, 1995; Smith and Lipsley, 1993).  Beginning in the 1980s, most of the latter half 
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of the welfare system (direct services) was outsourced to third party facilitators, primarily 
nonprofit organizations (Marwell, 2004; Salamon, 1995; Smith & Lipsley, 1993).  This is 
important to note for several reasons.  First, the federal government directly controls only 
the distribution of income support.  Federal control of service distribution is heavily 
outsourced and only partly controlled on a federal level.  However, because the supply of 
funds for social services is almost always less than the demand for them, private NGOs 
are in competition with one another.  “Their positioning between the state and citizens 
creates a layer of policy, decisions and implementation issues absent from the delivery of 
income transfers” (Marwell, 2004, p. 267).  This is to say that the nonprofit sector’s 
position between the State and the public is extraordinarily complicated by mechanisms 
of “discretion” (Marwell, 2004).  When the State’s responsibilities for public service 
were outsourced to nonprofits, there was a sense that the work of these nonprofits needed 
to be monitored in some way.  This project attends to four decades of this very 
complicated dynamic.  
Ronald Reagan’s decision to outsource these responsibilities was largely due to 
his espousal of Milton Friedman’s neoliberal ideologies.  He offered a two-tiered 
approach to neoliberal policy (1) “privatization,” outsourcing federal responsibilities to 
third party groups like churches and charities (Marwell 2004), which boosted the growth 
of America’s nonprofit sector in the 1980s (Marwell 2004; Salamon, 1995), and (2) 
“devolution”, outsourcing “discretionary measures” for government spending to states 
and counties (Marwell, 2004).  Above all, he dramatically renegotiated welfare 
distribution for people with disabilities or dependent children in an attempt to cut Aid to 
Families with Dependant Children (AFDC) caseloads.  
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I am interested in the discursive elements of Reagan’s policies.  How were these 
policies presented, and how was “the nonprofit” rhetorically fixated in these 
conversations?  I focus on what the Reagan administration said about itself, how the 
Reagan administration rhetorically packaged these policies, and on notable publics 
responses to these changes.  
In 1992, The Department of Health and Human Services predicted that Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) would result in a caseload reduction of 400,000 
families and annual federal savings of $1 billion (Englander & Kane, 1992).  Reagan 
“boasted” that his reforms cut 364,630 recipients (Columbia Journalism Review), and 
trumpeted affirmations for volunteers and volunteerism.  American volunteers were 
absolutely central in his privatization and devolution strategies.  Reagan also attempted to 
dissociate the federal government from anti-poverty efforts and progressives expressed 
concern and frustration in media outlets that the federal government was proctoring 
nonprofit behavior too closely and in inappropriate ways.  It was during Reagan’s 
presidency that nonprofit tensions began to boil. 
Ten years later, proctorship agencies like Guidestar emerged and promoted public 
surveillance of nonprofit organizations using federally regulated yardsticks (like IRS-
registration and validation and 990 forms).  These organizations were designed to collect 
massive amounts of data about American nonprofits in order to rate their efficacy and 
trustworthiness. Guidestar is careful to clarify that it “is not a charity evaluator” (Wasik, 
2013), rather it is a measure of verification.  Media coverage of organizations like 
Guidestar point to a new kind of public paranoia surrounding “crook-charities.”  
Nonprofit watchdogs offer “tracking,” and “standards for charitable accountability” (The 
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IRE Journal, 2003), but even these public-run, public-facilitated servers default to 
federally-determined standards.  “If a new group is raising money, the simplest way to 
determine if it’s tax exempt is to go to the source: The Internal Revenue Service” (The 
IRE Journal, 2010).  News outlets and nonprofits themselves have contributed to these 
watchdogging discourses, offering their takes on the most important validity standards for 
nonprofits.  A United Way Vice President in Roanoke, for example said, “You want to 
see a board of directors of at least 10 people, which indicates a strong community base 
[…] There should also be several funding sources, which gives the agency financial 
stability” (Pleasant, 2009).  Information Today described the anxiety of the modern donor 
narrating, “’Will they really spend my contribution on the cause or on some executive’s 
mansion?’ It’s a dilemma because we don’t want to be miserly and suspicious, yet the 
world is still full of crooks” (O’Leary, 2007); and offered further: 
With such stakes, transparency and accountability in the nonprofit sector are 
essential.  Not only must this money be properly spent, donors must have 
confidence if they are to keep giving.  So, whatever amount you give, check the 
charity watchdogs to see that it’s well used. (O’Leary, 2007) 
The Guidestar server (and others) enables or disables organizations based on their 
standards of validity.  A member of the ASSE Foundation noted, “Guidestar is the 
premier source of information on nonprofits in the U.S. Valued partner status is achieved 
only after nonprofits provide verifiable information concerning their IRS status, 
executive and board compensatory practices, and other information on their finances and 
programs” (ASSE Foundation, 2012).  At this juncture, “nonprofit” is positioned in 
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relation to a very different network of buzzwords: “crook,” “watchdog,” and 
“accountability,” for example, rather than “welfare,” “volunteerism,” and “America.”   
By 2012, the United States had recognized over 1.42 million tax-exempt 
organizations, and public charities reported over $3 trillion in total assets (NCCS, 2014).  
As a point of reference, one might compare this to the total expenditures of the US 
federal government, which that same year clocked in at $3.5 trillion.  America’s nonprofit 
sector is enormous and expanding rapidly.  In the last decade, total charitable giving has 
increased by $34.6 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars (almost $100 billion in current 
dollars) (Giving USA, 2014).  Total contributions have jumped 12.3% since the recession 
ended in 2009 (Giving USA, 2014); foundation giving between 1999 and 2009 increased 
84% (The Urban Institute, 2010); revenues of registered nonprofit organizations grew 
40% between 1998 and 2008 (The Urban Institute, 2010); and the number of registered 
nonprofits increased 31% between 1998 and 2008 (IRS reporting nonprofits grew closer 
to 50%) (The Urban Institute, 2010).  The nonprofit sector is empowered by the 
contributions of more than half of the residents of the U.S.  64% of American citizens 
contribute to organizations as volunteers, and 51% donate to charities (Giving USA).  In 
2013, Americans donated $335 billion to nonprofits, at a per-household rate of $2,974 
(Giving USA).  
The sector’s growth since the 1990s has been categorically celebrated as the 
advancement in American charity, but tensions in contemporary nonprofit discourse are 
intense in the mainstream.  Nonprofit watchdogging discourses become complicated by 
calls for government intervention and the post-recession adaptation of nonprofit policy.  
At the same time, a counter-discourse to “nonprofitization” emerges.  INCITE’s (2008) 
POLICING CHARITIES   
	  
11 
anthology, The Revolution Will Not be Funded, presents an unforgiving critique of 
America’s “nonprofitization.”  Its contributors examine the sector’s growth critically, 
with an eye towards the ideologies that have fueled its growth.  They suggest celebrating 
the size and expansion of not-for-profit work is reductive, and that it overlooks both the 
potential of other forms of collective action and the ideological restraints of the existing 
model.  In this context, “nonprofit” and “nonprofitization,” are aligned with very new 
buzzwords: “neoliberalism,” “capitalism,” and “white supremacy,” to name a few.   
Neither the mainstream discourse nor this quieter, radical counter-discourse, have served 
to resolve contemporary problems.  
 “The nonprofit’s” position in American discourses of service, citizenship, 
economics and duty has shifted dramatically since the 1980s, and has gone largely 
understudied.  This project problematized the “neutrality” of the American nonprofit by 
exhuming a history in which the nonprofit is not at all politically neutral. As Koopman 
(2012) offered, ideologies draw on pasts that have enabled their emergence and forecast 
futures that they take part in creating.  My intent, therefore, is not to establish cause; it is 
to explore formations, deactivations, conditions, and potentialities.  All together, I 
address a discursive lineage that begins during the Reagan presidency, traces through the 
rise of nonprofit proctorship in the 1990s, and culminates in current critical discourses of 
“de-nonprofitization.” Consider these two statements, which represent dramatically 
different orientations towards State responsibility, surveillance, and American 
volunteerism.  In the early 1980s, Ronald Reagan commented that, “The work of 
volunteer groups throughout our country represents the very heart and soul of America. 
They have helped make this the most compassionate, generous, and humane society that 
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ever existed on the face of this earth.”  He commented also that, “The nine most 
terrifying words in the English language are, ‘I’m from the government and I’m here to 
help” (Reagan, 1986).  Activist scholar, Andrea Smith, spoke thirty years later with the 
hindsight of 23 million newly established nonprofit organizations, saying that a so-called 
“nonprofit industrial complex […] controls dissent by incorporating it into the state 
apparatus, functioning as a ‘shadow state’ constituted by a network of institutions that do 
much of what government agencies are supposed to do with tax money in the areas of 
education and social services” (Smith, 2008, p. 8-9).  The weight of the relationship 
between the State and the nonprofit weighs heavily on each of these comments, which 
display two dramatically different understandings what The State is and should be.  They 
invite us to consider the vastly different rhetorical treatments of the nonprofit over this 
short window of time.  
  


























POLICING CHARITIES   
	  
14 
Doing Genealogical, Rhetorical History 
This project demands analysis that is both critical and historical.  I engage diverse 
archives of media, public address, scholarship and activist press in order to examine 
discursive trends and discursive changes.  As a result, my methodological toolbox must 
enable criticism across time and in these diverse contexts.  Having chosen among a great 
many historical and archival methodologies, I engage rhetorical history and Foucaultian 
genealogy.  In this chapter, I offer a brief description of each methodology, their merits 
and shortcomings, and their theoretical underpinnings.  I argue that elements of each 
methodology can be combined constructively to guide inquiry.  Finally, I speak to the 
construction of this project, and my decision to focus much of my discussion on networks 
of “charismatic terms” as they have been theorized by McGee (1980) and Weaver (2011). 
Rhetorical history and genealogy enable social movement criticism in different 
ways. Their incarnations can be traced back through decades of critical scholarship; and 
these incarnations are diverse and at times contradictory.  There are formulations of these 
methods, though, which are particularly emblematic of effective social movement 
criticism.  I focus on Condit’s approach to rhetorical history and Foucault’s rendering of 
genealogy. I will argue here that these two approaches to critical history offer different, 
compatible (and therefore complementary) benefits. 
Rhetorical History: Arguing from the Past 
Zarefsky (1998) has offered that rhetorical histories fall into four categories -- 
histories of rhetoric (how rhetoric has changed historically), rhetorics of history (how 
histories are communicated), historical studies of rhetorical practices, and rhetorical 
studies of historical events. Each of these approaches has a distinct purpose, and operates 
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based on different assumptions. For example, the goal of examining rhetorics of history 
might be primarily philosophical. Historical studies of rhetorical practices might be more 
diagnostic and prescriptive. Zarefsky’s argument, though, is that all of these approaches 
represent a way to “argue from history” (p. 28), and that arguing from history enables us 
to better understand collective memory.  
This methodology often assumes a constructivist epistemology and a 
constructionist ontology.  Clark and McKerrow (1998) explain that the constructionist 
approach is what enables historical methods to produce “critical literature.” For them, 
power is mediated presently in the narrative negotiation of the past. The present is and 
always already has been constructed in tellings of history. Gronbeck (1998) calls this “the 
appropriation of the past for presentest purposes” (p. 54), a “constant dialogue” between 
the past and the present in “a hermeneutical circle where neither can be comprehended 
without the other” (p. 57). “Knowing,” therefore, for the rhetorical historian, is not 
something that the critic can speak about in the past tense. (As I will explain later, this 
articulation of “knowing” is much more similar to Foucault’s genealogy than to Condit’s 
enactment of rhetorical history.)  
Gronbeck identifies some of the epistemological underpinnings of rhetorical 
history, which I will argue offer points of overlap with genealogy: that the past is 
unknowable, that history is a discursive practice, that history is bivocal, both narrative 
and argumentative, that professionalization has separated academic histories from public 
records of the past, that the past is more than historical interest, that multiple rhetorics of 
the past have been practiced by various groups (p. 48-50). Condit (1990), having perhaps 
more explicitly political goals, speaks both to this constructivist perspective and the 
POLICING CHARITIES   
	  
16 
pragmatic value of historical inquiry. She traces, for example, how rhetorical choices 
shaped political outcomes of the abortion debate (assuming that rhetorical actors make 
free choices which shape political outcomes), while also acknowledging that discourse is 
constitutive of and constituted by social change (assuming that political conditions enable 
and constrain a rhetor’s choices).  Most importantly, she offers insight into how powerful 
rhetorical histories can be for social movement criticism.  
Condit enacts the rhetorical historical method in three book-length projects 
between 1990 and 1999, and in each of them, she argues “from history” in order to build 
an argument about the collective memory of Americans.  While very different from one 
another, each of Condit’s projects identifies a fixture of American culture that has been 
misremembered in some way. Rhetorical history enables Condit to examine the political 
undercurrents of what appears to be not political at all.  Conversely, she examines the 
happenstance of some seemingly intentional political changes. Rhetorical histories, as 
composed by Condit, address the way things “are” and the way things came to be.  They 
unearth and overturn assumptions of things that have been naturalized and things that the 
public has been anesthetized to.  Condit shows the critical, historical value in “describing 
‘what people have said’” (p. 2).  She shows that this description is more complicated and 
more relevant than many would imagine. 
Condit makes many of her assumptions explicit.  She acknowledges the role of 
power in facilitating the popularity and traction of public argument, but she understands 
rhetoric to be a persuasive tool that can be harnessed and this requires some finessing as 
we connect her to Foucault. She writes that “there is always the potential for the public 
interest to be hijacked, via persuasion” (Condit, 1990, p. 6). Rhetoric (and discourse), for 
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Condit, is tangibly real. At times, her motives are empirical -- to uncover what really 
was. Rhetoric is a “process” that “functions” with “impacts.” Rhetoric is the 
“materialization” of the idea (1990, p. 9) and “therefore may communicate social change 
to people by using language as a medium that negotiates a collective ‘expression’ of 
social conditions and social interests” (1990, p. 9). Rhetoric, for Condit, is the “social 
force” that makes ideas persuasive to an audience through either “sheer repetition” or 
“effective expression.” She is careful to clarify that suggestions of a “duped public” are 
superficial, and that renderings of a single public are not productive. Ultimately, though, 
the value of rhetorical history, for Condit, lies in the following passage:  
Charting the changes in the units of discourse that appear in a controversy across 
time and relating these changes to the general and specific forces of rhetoric can 
produce better explanations of the processes that operate to bring about the 
particular forms that social changes take. (p. 11) 
Studying rhetoric has value to the social critic because rhetoric is a force, influenced by 
the collective thoughts of an unstable, amoebic public, which effects social change. 
Archives of rhetoric offer a somewhat stable picture of an unstable public, and examining 
discourse can lead the scholar to veiled political realities. 
If we accept Condit’s assumptions, that discourse and political realities are 
mutually constitutive of one another, that they are dialectically linked, that actors are 
conditioned by circumstances which enable and constrain the construction of their own 
conditions, then rhetorical history has a great deal of merit for the cultural critic and the 
social movement scholar alike. The role of agency in the Catch 22 minefield of 
constructivism is complicated, but as Jasinkski (1998) explains, it is the reason why the 
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question of power hinges on rhetoric. Rhetorical history, he says, can be a site for agency. 
He cites Rorty’s argument that “change is not a matter of choice or decision... [rather] a 
by-product of continuous linguistic redescriptions of the world” (Rorty as cited in 
Jasinski, 1998, p. 79). This belief, that description is both the lock and the key of 
criticism, undergirds both Condit’s and Foucault’s approaches. In the most extreme 
(Foucualtian) approach, objectivity is displaced, and criticism becomes a matter of 
radical description, not empirical deduction. Condit works toward both goals at once, 
blending post-structuralism with pragmatism. 
Ball (1998) has echoed the sentiment that the communication discipline has 
overlooked the critical value of descriptive historical work. She notes that the very root of 
“history” is “histor,” meaning “to judge” (p. 61). These scholars look to “description,” 
then, as a highly political process. Drawing on the tenets of Begriffsgeschichte 
(conceptual history), they see “conceptual change” to be a central fixture of the 
methodology, what Stephen Greenblatt calls “self-fashioning” (Jasinski, 1998). Put 
another way, text production is dialectically linked to human subjectivity, a relationship 
in which each is the artifact of the other and each constitutes the conditions of the other. 
At the most fundamental level, for rhetorical historians, description is change. 
The radical possibilities of historical description as change-making are one merit 
of the rhetorical historical approach.  McGee (1998) argues that the solution of 
ideological problems must be ideological, rather than infrastructural. “It’s got to be done 
term by term, argument by argument.” And this spotlights yet another benefit of the 
method -- rhetorical history makes the examination of culture, of ideology, manageable -- 
extraordinarily complicated when done with precision -- but doable.  
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Swidler (1986) offers that rhetorical history examines how cultural symbols 
function as “toolkits” that enable and constrain action, impacting cultural actors 
particularly in “unsettled periods” when these ideological scripts for action are relied 
upon heavily. The examination of cultural symbols, therefore, offer a toolkit for the 
researcher. Cathcart (1972) has also argued that rhetorical examination of tokens and 
symbols and their deployment enables a more precise study of large, ideological, political 
problems. If Foucault offers a more nuanced and perhaps more theoretically complicated 
explanation of how discourse functions in the context of social change, we might ask why 
we would use Condit’s articulation of rhetorical history at all.  My answer is that Condit 
offers specific “units of discourse” that enable her to examine rhetoric “at work.” These 
are ultimate terms, stories, and characterizations.  I’ll return to a more nuanced discussion 
of these units after explaining the tenets of genealogical inquiry. 
Genealogical Criticism 
Genealogy, while overlapping with rhetorical history a great deal, more radically 
accepts the transformative powers of description, the instability of knowing, the 
disjointedness of “the public,” and post-structuralist imaginings of political “reality.” 
There are two questions worth asking then -- Where genealogy is similar to rhetorical 
history, why do both, and where they are different, are the inconsistencies irreconcilable 
for the critic? 
Like rhetorical histories, genealogies start with the present and trace conditions 
back (Koopman, 2013).  Foucault would agree with Condit’s presumption that “‘the 
public’ is not a simple entity” (Condit, 1990, p. 7) and with her argument that “public 
discourse is an active, change-producing, transformative process, not merely a passive 
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conveyor belt” (Condit, 1990, p. 11). Foucault addresses the past, and futures told from 
the past that never came to be. In doing so, Foucault considers junctures rather than 
lineages, networks of possibilities in which ways of knowing power were negotiated and 
not at all inevitable. In Discipline and Punish, for example, Foucault considers a lineage 
from elaborate public spectacles of torture, through the instantaneous corporeality of the 
guillotine, to an understanding of punishment as “the most hidden part of the penal 
process” (p. 9). But he addresses also “the dream of reformers... the city of punishments 
in which a thousand small theatres would have provided an endless multicoloured 
representation of justice” (p. 307).   Genealogy, facilitated in this way, offers analysis of 
both the Nacheinanderung (one-after-anotherness) and the Nebeneinanderung 
(relationships between simultaneous events) of discursive history (or as McGee would 
say, the vertical and horizontal trajectories of terms). 
One of the most significant overlaps between Foucault and Condit is their focus 
on unveiling neutralities. Foucault (1977) writes: 
Today we are rather inclined to ignore [the disappearance of torture as a public 
spectacle]; perhaps, in its time, it gave rise to too much inflated rhetoric; perhaps 
it has been attributed too readily and too emphatically to a process of 
‘humanization,’ thus dispensing with the need for further analysis.  (p. 7-8) 
He excavated archives of punishment and engaged the effects of this “humanistic” shift 
on the Western psyche and imaginings of violence and “public responsibility” for it (p. 
9). “It is the certainty of being punished and not the horrifying spectacle of public 
punishment that must discourage crime” (p. 9).  More than Condit, he is explicit about 
what history can do for the critic.  
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I would like to write the history of this prison, with all the political investments of 
the body that it gathers together in its closed architecture. Why? Simply because I 
am interested in the past? No, if one means by that writing a history of the past in 
terms of the present. Yes if one means writing the history of the present. (p. 31) 
Rhetorical historians and genealogists agree on this point: Historical examinations are not 
for the purpose of examining the past. They are for the purpose of examining the present. 
Foucault’s earlier work in archeology (1972) offers a similarly nuanced approach 
to historical inquiry, with some clear deviations from his genealogical approach. In 
archeology,  
 [Foucault] had turned instead to an examination of the space that determined, if 
not the existence of discourses, at least the possible forms in which configurations 
of knowledge and practice could emerge. Rather than focusing on what was 
known (history) or why knowledge is possible (epistemology), he investigated 
how fields of knowledge are structured (archeology).  (Major-Poetzl, 1983, p. 21).  
Major-Poetzl (1983) articulates clearly that Foucault’s goals were not at all objective in 
his archeology. Rather, “[h]e examines various perceptions” (p. 149). Koopman (2013) 
offers that genealogy is not an alternative to archeology, but an expansion of it, having 
different but not contradictory goals. Archeologies examine false continuities of history 
by taking discourse as its focus, genealogy examines false continuities, false neutralities, 
and potentialities. Archeology asks how collective memory is structured and structurated. 
Genealogy asks further, how it might have been structurated otherwise, why these 
potentialities were foreclosed on, and what these foreclosures tell us about the matrices of 
power that facilitate collective knowing.  
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Fusing the Methods 
Condit’s fashioning of rhetorical history is similar to archeology in style, and 
similar to genealogy in purpose. That is, Condit’s rhetorical histories are critical of 
continuity, and examine apparent neutralities in political history and political discourse. 
They do not, however, examine potentialities. Condit attempts to unhinge discursive 
trajectories from apparent neutralities (for example, that “equality” is an incontestable 
goal of anti-racism, and that scientists guide scientific developments). My comparison to 
Foucault’s archeologies is not to say that Condit’s work is in any way “classical.” As 
Major-Poetzl (1983) has explained, Foucault’s archeology represents not only the 
development of a new historical method, but an epistemology that deviates from 
evolutionary ways of thinking about history, lineage, and the presence of the past. 
Koopman (2013) explains that genealogy is the work of “emergence and 
transformations” while archeology is the work of “existence and targets of 
transformation.” As he explains, archeology is necessary but not sufficient for genealogy. 
I would say the same of rhetorical history. 
Rhetorical history’s similarities to archeology make it compatible with genealogy. 
Foucault asks the question, how did we get from point A to point B in just a century’s 
time, but answering this question is not his final question. 
This crucial point of Foucualt’s philisophico-historical work has been so widely 
misunderstood that it is today commonplace that the central message of Foucault 
is that things could be otherwise than they are when indeed the real force of his 
thought is to show us how things might be transformed on the basis of the 
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materials furnished by our contingently constructed persons. (Koopman, 2013, p. 
44) 
Foucault attempts to understand prison reform as something other than a humanitarian 
effort, unveiling matrices of power in the process.  Foucault is not re-visiting history, he 
is re-annotating it. He is, above all, concerned with “submerged problems” (Koopman, 
2013, p.1).  
Rhetorical history is not only complementary to genealogy, but a necessary 
component of it.  Furthermore, Condit’s performance of rhetorical history makes the 
practice more accessible to the critic with a political focus.  Taken together, rhetorical 
history and genealogy enable the critic to unveil false neutralities and identify potential 
areas for transformation. 
Units of Analysis (Archives & Terms) 
 Fusing these two methodologies requires clarification with regard to the unit of 
analysis and the scope of analysis.  Foucault had a megalomaniacal approach to data 
collection – He drew on institutional records, biographies, private diaries, news, building 
blueprints, medical encyclopedias, apparently anything he could get his hands on.  I have 
narrowed the data set for this project to two or three kinds of data per chapter, focusing 
on presidential speeches, news media responses to relevant tropes and topics, 
organizational archives (mission statements, organizational histories, advertising 
materials, public reports, etc.), activist newsletters, activist news, and published activist 
scholarship.   
 Narrowing my field of criticism further, I center my analysis on particular 
“charismatic terms,” ultimate terms, God terms and devil terms (conceptualized by 
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Weaver), ideographs (as conceptualized by McGee) and the tropes, terms, charged 
language, and characters that are used in conjunction with these ideology-terms.  These 
networks of charged terms emerged through the excavation of hundreds of pages of 
archives.  This style of examination echoes Condit’s work. 
 Despite their incongruities, components of early theorizations of ultimate terms 
and ideographs align with genealogy.  Specifically, I found genealogical value in 
descriptions that call for the examination of language and the ideas it represents.  Weaver, 
McGee, and Foucault, while differing dramatically in their conceptions of power and 
their definitions of “ideology,” all offer methodologies that treat rhetoric and ideology as 
intrinsically linked and wholly inseparable.  For Weaver (2011), this linkage is a kind of 
ordering of terms, whereby particular language is accepted as more capable or more 
politically “absolute” than others.  Terms that are rendered unimpeachable are of 
particular interest to Weaver, as beliefs, values, and rhetorical power are somehow 
contained within them.   
 Weaver explains,  
[D]espite the variations of fashion, an age which is not simply distraught manages 
to achieve some system of relationship among the attractive and among the 
repulsive terms, so that we can work out an order of weight and precedence in the 
prevailing rhetoric once we have discerned the ‘rhetorical absolutes’ – the terms 
to which the very highest respect is paid.  (Weaver, 2011, p. 212)  
Overlooking the causal relationship between rhetoric and belief for a moment, we might 
adopt part of his argument, that terms become vessels for ideas, and that terms are 
“ranked” as a result.  Weaver takes “progress” as one of his examples:  
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‘Progress’ becomes the salvation man is placed on earth to work out; and just as 
there can be no achievement more than salvation, so there can be no activity more 
justified in enlisting our sympathy and support than ‘progress.’ (Weaver, 2011, p. 
213)   
Focusing on “terms” in this way allows us to examine specific rhetorical moves that are 
not branded as essentially good or bad, but so bound up in networks of familiar values 
(Foucault called them “warm” values) that they come to appear obvious, politically 
neutral, and therefore dangerous.   
Weaver (2011) offers, “There are but three ways for language to affect us.  It can 
move us toward what is good; it can move us toward what is evil; or it can, in a 
hypothetical third place, fail to move us at all.”  Foucault (and more contemporary 
rhetorical historians like Condit) would cringe at this quote, as they would more likely 
say that language and ideas mutually constitute one another. While Foucault is not 
concerned with ideology as something that veils free thought or direct the masses towards 
evil (as Weaver and McGee are), he is concerned with apparent objectivities (the 
humanism of prison reform, the repressive silencing of sex-talk) that neutralize and are 
neutralized by particular discursive trends.  Taken together, one can engage in rhetorical 
historical examination that addresses neutralizing discursive shifts and what Weaver 
(2011) calls the “potency” of single terms.  In this way, their approaches are not entirely 
incompatible.  We cannot, in a genealogical project, examine how ideologically charged 
terms define public beliefs.  We can, however, explore how individual terms (and 
networks of charged terms) have conditioned ways of discussing ideas and ways of 
understanding social problems.  What we gain, though, by looking back to Weaver’s 
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work, is his argument that charged terms compel sacrifice on a national level.  He 
explains: 
[Progress] is probably the only term which gives to the average American or West 
European of today a concept of something bigger than himself, which is socially 
impelled to accept and even to sacrifice for.  This capacity to demand sacrifice is 
probably the surest indication of the ‘god term,’ for when a term is so sacrosanct 
that the material goods of this life must be mysteriously rendered up for it, then 
we feel justified in saying that it is in some sense ultimate. (Weaver, 2011, p. 214)   
A discussion of the relationships between discourse, power, and material sacrifice does 
not re-emerge in contemporary discussions of genealogy and rhetorical history, but is at 
the crux of my questions about American volunteerism and charity.   
This project revisits the question of value-laden, discursively driven sacrifice, 
from a position of social constructivism.  Weaver (1985) suggests, in the spirit of 
rhetorical history, that the critical examination of charged terms can unveil power 
structures and enable resistance.  “Perhaps these observations will help the speaker who 
would speak against the stream of ‘progress,’ or who, on the other hand, would parry 
some blow aimed at him through the potency of the word, to realize what a momentum 
he is opposing” (p. 91).  A genealogist would not be so interested in resisting ideology, 
but she would have a political orientation and an eye for subjugated discourse. 
 McGee’s (1980) conception of the ideograph offers a kind of bridge between 
Weaver and Foucault.  He debunks the ideal of political “truth,” offering “no matter how 
firmly we believe, [it] is always an illusion” (p. 4), but still clings to ideology as a sort of 
veil that interrupts free thought.  Not unlike Weaver (2011), McGee (1980) is concerned 
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with language’s coercive capacity; it’s ability to create the portrait of truth while enacting 
something unrighteous.  However, he moves toward an understanding of rhetoric as a 
conditioning force, rather than a mechanism of control.  He introduces a communicative 
lens to Marxist theories, arguing that “Human beings are ‘conditioned,’ not directly to 
belief and behavior, but to a vocabulary of concepts that function as guides, warrants, 
reasons, or excuses for behavior and belief” (p. 6).  The danger in this, for McGee, (and I 
would argue for Weaver and Foucault as well) is that we will “forget” that semantics are 
political.  He worries that we will “make a rhetoric of war to persuade us of war’s 
necessity, but then forget that it is a rhetoric and regard negative popular judgments of it 
as unpatriotic cowardice” (p. 6).  Again, it is important to note that Weaver (2011) and 
McGee (1980) concern themselves specifically with the enactment of State power onto 
the public and that Foucault offers a much more amorphous and much less episodic 
understanding of “power.”  But the three scholars share a concern for discourses that 
appear obvious and apolitical.  All three scholars would be concerned, for example, with 
McGee’s example, the “hero” who goes to war for God and apple pie, and the “coward” 
who “reasonably” moves to Montreal. 
McGee (1980) offers us a methodological bridge.  First, he offers a point of 
transition between Weaver’s (2011) notion of sacrifice and Foucault’s treatment of non-
localized discursive power by beginning a discussion of rhetorical conditioning.  Second, 
he offers a way to examine the force of particular terms in the context of broader 
political trends, giving us a fixed and somewhat manageable focus for close reading.  
Third, he offers examples that clearly display the relationship between ultimate terms (or 
ideographs) and the power of epideictic discourse in the “obvious” casting of praise and 
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blame and definitions of civic duty (p. 11).  And finally, he names the “ideograph,” and 
offers that part of its power is in its fluidity, it’s ability to “expand and contract” in 
meaning (p. 10), its changing yet constant situation in vertical time, (p. 11).  
This Project 
 The project I have organized draws on the goals and questions posed in 
genealogical inquiry.  It examines a forty-year period between 1980 and the present.  
Specifically, it focuses on “junctures” (moments where a discursive shift occurred or 
almost occurred), subjugated discourses (opposition to dominant discourses that has been 
largely unacknowledged), potentialities (shifts that almost occurred), and the influence of 
power-knowledge on the development of public discourse.  However, in order to distill 
the immeasurable archive of American history down to a manageable scope for a project 
of this size, I have adopted the structure of a rhetorical history, specifically as it has been 
theorized and practiced by Condit (1993, 1994, 1999).  I focus my analysis on artifacts of 
public discourse (political news media, presidential speeches, activist news, etc.), and 
attend particularly to discursive formations as they are powered by the movement of 
ultimate terms, ideographs, and other powerful tropes that have empowered and disabled 
particular discursive trends. 
My assumption is that both dominant and subjugated discourses of American 
volunteerism, nonprofit organizations, and tax exemption tracing back into history have 
enabled and constrained the way that these ideas are discussed, labeled, and given 
political power in the present.  Each chapter of the project addresses a different juncture 
in the development of these concepts.  The following chapter examines the 1980s, and 
specifically Ronald Reagan’s contribution to the movement of tropes surrounding welfare 
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reform, the nonprofit sector, American heroes, and American volunteerism.  I explore 
Reagan’s conditioning of the American public to particular ways of talking about 
volunteerism as a precursor to a second juncture that took place in the 1990s.  I analyzed 
transcripts of Ronald Reagan’s campaign speeches, presidential addresses and states of 
the union.  Additionally, I examined over a hundred newspaper articles that respond to 
Ronald Reagan’s public address.   
The next chapter addresses the emergence of nonprofit watchdogging agencies 
and nonprofit proctorship discourses in the 1990s.  I considered hundreds of newspaper 
articles and advertisements discussing the emergence of watchdogging agencies or their 
benefits and drawbacks.  Additionally, this chapter considers the mission statements and 
histories of many of these watchdogging agencies.  I examine how volunteer epideictics 
evolved into typologies of good and bad donors, and good and bad nonprofits, and how 
this typology came to hinge on a new, neoliberal subject.   
The final chapter addresses two competing discourses, one dominant and one 
subjugated, which paint dramatically different portraits of the modern state of America’s 
volunteer sector.  First, it explores celebratory discourse that identifies the present day as 
an age of American humanitarianism and praises the unprecedented size and breadth of 
tax-exempt work.  Second, it speaks to a competing (largely overlooked) discourse, 
emerging from activist circles and activist scholarship, which laments the 
nonprofitization of America, and advocates for an anti-racist, poverty politic of de-
nonprofitization.  This chapter will examine the different meanings that these two publics 
have drawn from the many tropes and terms that have emerged and gained traction since 
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Reagan’s presidency.  Above all, these critical examinations of discursive archives aim to 
answer the three questions that were introduced in Chapter 1: 
1. How have “American volunteerism,” “nonprofit,” and their associated 
network of charismatic terms functioned rhetorically and ideographically at 
each of these three junctures? 
2. What has the use of these terms enabled and constrained at each of these 
junctures?  How did these terms evolve in the context of power structures, 
and how did their use negotiate, resist, and reinforce existing power 
structures? 
3. What can this rhetorical history tell us about the problems of the present?  
What can activists and applied scholars do with this kind of archive? 
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Genealogists examine the discursive events, shifts, and trends that condition 
current political trends. The past becomes a prism through which we learn the present. 
Rhetoric enabling today’s volunteer sector -- its force, its breadth, and its resonance with 
the American public -- emerged decades ago, even centuries ago. A history of nonprofit 
politics, for example, would begin as far back as the American Revolution, the 
emergence of early fraternities and secret societies, and the laudation of individual 
freedom, when nongovernmental associations represented a threat to liberty (Hall, 2005). 
I aim to examine discourses of American volunteerism as they relate to more current 
conceptions of freedom, individualism, competition, and enterprise. Specifically, I trace a 
history of the relationship between American volunteerism and neoliberal discourse since 
1980. In this chapter, I investigate Ronald Reagan’s rhetorical contributions to the 
American Public -- the terms, tropes and characters that Reagan brought to life, and how 
they were received. I will argue that Reagan’s pulpit primed Americans with language 
that promoted a neoliberal understanding of what it means to serve. I will show that he 
primed the public with regard to three tenets of neoliberalism: individualism, 
privatization, and entrepreneurship.  
I refer to neoliberalism as a discursive formation, rather than an economic trend or 
an ideological shift (a distinction outlined by Gilbert, a la Foucault): 
‘The discursive formation is not ... a developing totality, with its own dynamism 
or inertia, carrying with it, in an unformulated discourse, what it does not say, 
what it has not yet said, or what contradicts it at that moment; it is not a rich, 
difficult germination, it is a distribution of gaps, voids, absences, limits, 
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divisions’. The explicit point here is that simply because a set of statements, ideas 
and practices does not have the absolute uniformity of a pure doctrine, it can 
nonetheless be identified and analysed [sic] as a coherent object.  (Gilbert, 2013, 
p. 8) 
The discursive formation (as opposed to an ideology or hegemony) is amoebic in shape. 
Reagan’s neoliberal treatment of volunteerism is dynamic, gap-ridden, and at times 
paradoxical. We must then take very seriously Foucault’s point that we can examine an 
impure doctrine with a level of coherency in order to broaden our analytical scope and 
consider macro-level discursive trends. 
Ronald Reagan’s Presidency 
Ronald Reagan’s poverty politic was served to the American public with a keen 
wit. He was “the man who joked that America had fought a war on poverty, and that 
poverty had won” (Crafton, 2014, p. 27). Despite his light-heartedness, Ronald Reagan’s 
presidency oversaw a dramatic renegotiation of welfare, poverty response, and service 
provision. Marwell (2004) notes that his efforts to “shrink the size and influence of the 
federal government” catalyzed “privatization” and “devolution,” both of which have 
enabled the growth of the nonprofit sector since the 1970s (p. 267). His policies 
effectively renegotiated the burden of responsibility for the poor and redefined the roles 
of the public and the public sector.  
As was discussed briefly in Chapter 1, Reagan offered a two-tiered vision, 
displacing government-funded services and instating new responsibilities for private 
citizens. Volunteerism was packaged as All-American, and big government framed to 
sound bumbling and incapable. Reagan once stated, for example, “The work of volunteer 
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groups throughout our country represents the very heart and soul of America. They have 
helped make this the most compassionate, generous, and humane society that ever existed 
on the face of this earth.” And famously, he offered, “The nine most terrifying words in 
the English language are, ‘I’m from the government and I’m here to help’” (Reagan, 
1986).  
During his presidency, most direct service welfare was outsourced to third party 
facilitators, namely nonprofit organizations (Marwell, 2004; Salamon, 1995). The federal 
government would only be responsible for distributing income support. Service 
distribution was heavily outsourced and only partly controlled on a federal level. 
Reagan’s agenda with respect to anti-poverty work was fueled primarily by his adoption 
of Milton Friedman’s economic theory -- his rejection of Keynesianism, his promotion of 
monetarism, and his formulation of Negative Income Tax (NIT), where families below 
the poverty line are supported rather than taxed by the federal government.  Perhaps 
Reagan’s most influential move was the development of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (OBRA), a renegotiation of welfare distribution for people with 
disabilities or dependent children; it was designed to cut AFDC caseloads (eliminating, 
Reagan said, such problems as the “welfare queen”). OBRA represented a substantial cut 
to public assistance and “combined categorical programs into the Social Services Block 
Grant” (Stoesz & Karger, 1993). These changes were dramatic, and they were intended to 
be so.  
While the economic and political impact of Reagan’s rollbacks might be 
contested (Englander & Kane, 1992), I am interested in the discursive elements of 
Reagan’s platform. How was his plan presented, and how was the nonprofit sector fixated 
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in these conversations? Above all, how did Ronald Reagan sell to the American public 
that responsibility for the poor, the disabled, and the needy would no longer belong to the 
government, but to volunteer citizens? How was it so effectively gift-wrapped? 
Ronald Reagan’s Public Address 
Reagan’s rhetorical strategies were multifold, but on the broadest scale his 
treatment of American volunteerism was highly epideictic and driven by ethos appeals. 
He framed almost every mention of volunteerism, nonprofits, and welfare rollbacks, by 
casting praise and blame and renegotiating the responsibilities of the upstanding 
American citizen. Epideictic rhetoric most consistently concerns “issues of honor and 
dishonor” (Murphy, 1992, p. 68). Further, it both assigns and ritualizes praise and blame 
(Vivian, 2006). Murphy (2003) explains that it allows public judgment to be viewed 
through a “prism” of honor and dishonor (p. 626). Condit (1985) is perhaps the most 
specific in explaining that epideictic serves “three functional pairs: definition and 
understanding, display and entertainment, and the shaping and sharing of a community” 
(p. 288). In this case, Reagan used the epideictic to redefine the nation’s understanding of 
volunteerism, to build an enthusiastic community of American volunteers, and in true 
Reagan form, to entertain. Some scholars have offered that the epideictic form is a 
strategy that is preventative of radicalism, and divisiveness (Dow, 1989, p. 301), that it 
“precludes dissent” (Murphy, 1992, p. 72). This point is particularly important to a 
genealogy, as genealogies and rhetorical histories attempt to unveil the tensions that exist 
in discourses that are without (or appear to be without) dissent.  Reagan created a “prism” 
of honor through which American volunteerism could be understood and adopted. 
 




Praising the New American Hero, and Blaming Bad Humanitarians 
In Reagan’s pre-presidential and presidential addresses, he framed his welfare 
plan, his “tax burden relief” strategies and his economic overhaul. In doing so, he was 
forced to explain who would take on the responsibilities that the federal government 
would be abdicating in Reagan’s ideal political landscape. This presented a rhetorical 
challenge for Reagan: The government will abdicate social service responsibilities, and 
volunteer Americans must fill the void. The federal government now had to sell this to 
the American public. One of Reagan’s primary strategies was to spotlight “heroes” of 
American volunteerism, calling them heroes of the American “spirit.” In Reagan’s 1986 
State of the Union, for example, he discussed four Americans embodying the American 
dream and the American spirit. The first two American heroes Reagan described were a 
medical researcher, and a child gospel music performer. But the final two speak to 
characters serving in a very particular way. The American dream is at risk, and is 
resurrected by the volunteer spirit: 
We see the dream being saved by the courage of the 13-year-old Shelby Butler, 
honor student and member of her school's safety patrol. Seeing another girl freeze 
in terror before an out-of-control school bus, she risked her life and pulled her to 
safety. With bravery like yours, Shelby, America need never fear for our future.  
And we see the dream born again in the joyful compassion of a 13 year old, 
Trevor Ferrell. Two years ago, age 11, watching men and women bedding down 
in abandoned doorways -- on television he was watching -- Trevor left his 
suburban Philadelphia home to bring blankets and food to the helpless and 
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homeless. And now 250 people help him fulfill his nightly vigil. Trevor, yours is 
the living spirit of brotherly love. (Ronald Reagan’s 1986 State of Union) 
The American spirit of humanism is rendered brotherly and future-oriented. 
Reagan tells the public that it is brave to step up and address poverty, homelessness, and 
distress in an entirely non-political, non-systemic way. The spirit of the American 
volunteer is so simple, so intuitive, so spur of the moment, that a child can do it. And 
perhaps a child, unfettered by the desire to complicate poverty response, is best 
positioned for Reagan’s praises. American heroism is individuated, volunteerism is made 
a goal for the individual, rather than the collective. And most importantly, heroes are 
nongovernmental providers of good will. Civic volunteer heroism is for the every man, 
unaffiliated and unobstructed, able to recognize unjust moments rather than unjust 
systems and responding with a quick adrenaline rush, a step out of the suburbs and into 
moving traffic. 
This call for individual heroic responses to social problems was not unique 
Reagan’s second State of the Union. In his first State of the Union, he assigned praise to 
individual civic heroes similarly.  
[T]here are unsung heroes: single parents, couples, church and civic volunteers. 
Their hearts carry without complaint the pains of family and community 
problems. They soothe our sorrow, heal our wounds, calm our fears, and share our 
joy.  
A person like Father Ritter is always there. His Covenant House programs in New 
York and Houston provide shelter and help to thousands of frightened and abused 
children each year. The same is true of Dr. Charles Carson. Paralyzed in a plane 
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crash, he still believed nothing is impossible. Today in Minnesota, he works 80 
hours a week without pay, helping pioneer the field of computer-controlled 
walking. He has given hope to 500,000 paralyzed Americans that some day they 
may walk again. (Ronald Reagan’s 1982 State of Union) 
Reagan’s heroes not only address material needs of fellow Americans, they carry on a 
particular American affect of service-provision, independent volunteerism and solitary 
heroic action.  
And then there’s Larry Skutnik, the centerpiece of Reagan’s epideictic. Larry 
Skutnik was a government employee who, while off the clock, caught a glimpse of “a 
chance to be a hero” (Washington Post, Jan 15, 1982). Skutnik, on his walk home from 
work, witnessed a plane crash into the freezing Potomac River in Washington D.C. 
Seeing a woman drowning in the wreckage, Skutnik dove into the water and pulled her to 
safety. Though he had hypothermia, he lent his jacket to a crash survivor. He resisted 
medical treatment, saying “I’d heard all these horror stories about hospitals and all the 
forms. The first thing I said when I got there was ‘is this going to cost me anything?’” 
(Washington Post, Jan 15, 1982). He was welcomed by the media as the everyman’s 
hero, no frills, nothing fancy, just doing the right thing.  
“Nobody else was doing anything,” noted the Washington Post (Jan 15, 1982). 
Skutnik said “it was the only way.” And this is key -- Reagan noted that “Nothing had 
picked him out particularly to be a hero, but without hesitation there he was and he saved 
her life” (Washington Post, Jan 15, 1982). The child-like simplicity of Shelby Butler and 
Trevor Ferrell is echoed in Reagan’s descriptions of Skutnik. “Skutnik said he didn’t 
have any profound thoughts. ‘I just did it’” (Washington Post, Jan 15, 1982). Americans 
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were conditioned to see Skutnik’s spirit as resonating with all that it means to be 
American. 
Foucault (2008) explains that the conception of labor in American neoliberalism 
is marked by a focus on enterprise.  
This is not a conception of labor power; it is a conception of capital-ability which, 
according to diverse variables, receives a certain income that is a wage, an 
income-wage, so that the worker himself appears as a sort of enterprise for 
himself.... the basic element to be deciphered by economic analysis is not so much 
the individual, or processes and mechanisms, but enterprises. (p. 225)  
He goes on, “In neoliberalism -- and it does not hide this; it proclaims it -- there is also a 
theory of homo economicus, but he is not at all a partner of exchange. Homo economicus 
is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself” (p. 226). I would argue that the economic 
rationalization associated with neoliberalism, which Foucault discusses here, was applied 
to American understandings of volunteerism during the Reagan administration. The 
individual’s value comes from a source of self-propulsion. The body, as a solitary force 
of entrepreneurial spirit, drives neoliberalism.  
The individual’s life must be lodged, not within a framework of a big enterprise 
like the firm or, if it comes to it, the state, but within the framework of a 
multiplicity of diverse enterprises connected up to and entangled with each other, 
enterprises which are in some way ready to hand for the individual, sufficiently 
limited in their scale for the individual’s actions, decisions, and choices to have 
meaningful and perceptible effects, and numerous enough for him not to be 
dependent on one alone. (Foucault, 2008, p. 241) 
POLICING CHARITIES   
	  
40 
Reagan positioned Skutnik at the center of his State of the Union, and while the media 
recognized his story prior to the State of the Union, it took off after Reagan’s address. “A 
young government employee who dived into the river to save a woman too weak to grip a 
rescue line spent most of their time today giving interviews” (New York Times, Jan. 15 
1982). He was “one bright patch on a black day,” (Washington Post, Jan 17, 1982); a 
perfectly ordinary looking young man… modest to the point of humility” (Washington 
Post, Jan 17, 1982). Reagan used Skutnik to shout out, “Don’t let anyone tell you that 
America’s best days are behind her. We’ve seen it triumph too often in our lives to stop 
believing in it now” (Washignton Post, Jan 27, 1982). What made Skutnik so spectacular, 
though, was his extraordinary resonance with the Reagan’s audience. The Washington 
Post covered Reagan’s State of the Union: 
Most of the 21 bursts of applause that punctuated Mr. Reagans’ speech came from 
the Republic side, with the democrats for the most part listening in icy silence. A 
number of Democrats laughed aloud at Mr. Reagan’s pledge of support for 
women’s rights and at his acknowledgement that the 1983 deficit would exceed 
his expectation. The entire audience joined in a standing ovation for Lenny 
Skutnik, who dived into the frigid Potomac River to rescue a victim of the January 
13 airplane crash here. Mr. Skutnik sat with Mrs. Reagan during the address and 
was hailed by the President as epitomizing the heroic spirit in the United States.  
(Washington Post, January 27, 1982, Emphasis Added)  
Lenny Skutnik’s dive into the Potomac was the great bipartisan “icebreaker,” good for 
applause on either side of the isle. Skutnik was the centerpiece of the new American 
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Spirit, and he was rhetorically unimpeachable. For a moment, the term “Skutnik” was 
currency.  
Liberals were incensed. The Washington Post published a satirical piece in 1982 
speculating about where Washington bureaucrats would go when Reagan succeeded in 
fostering welfare families to churches and synagogues in 10 family groups. It ended:  
The bureaucrats? It is doubtful that any state would simply close their borders to 
them. The United Nations might protest, and the Soviets could make propaganda 
saying it was a violation of the Helsinki Accords. Possibly if they can get relatives 
in other states to sponsor them, they could make it to Nebraska or Kansas. What 
would they do back home? They might as well grow African violets, drink coffee 
and read the papers -- that’s what the country thinks they do anyway -- and drop 
the name of Lenny Skutnik whenever possible. (Washington Post, January 31, 
1982) 
Skutnik’s name was politically unstoppable, and it appears to have been maddening to 
those in disagreement. Name-dropping Skutnik got the job done. Everyone knew it, and 
nobody could stop it, so we might as well take up gardening. 
Was Lenny Skutnik not unequivocally heroic? By any metric he is surely 
deserving of praise. This, of course, is the wrong question for the genealogist. Skutnik’s 
very particular form of volunteerism was affiliated by Reagan with the American spirit, 
and assisted in the reconstruction of American values and the American orientation 
towards volunteerism. Foucault (2004) wrote, “the ordoliberal idea of making the 
enterprise the universally generalized social model functions in their analysis or program 
as a support to what they designate as the reconstruction of a set of what could be called 
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‘warm’ moral and cultural values which are presented precisely as antithetical to the 
‘cold’ mechanism of competition” (p. 242). When Reagan commends Skutnik on the 
national stage, warm American values are tied to a charming and simpleton form of 
humanitarianism, which involves no forethought. Take an off-the-clock government 
employee with a down-home manner. Add a can-do attitude and a good hoisting of 
oneself by one’s bootstraps. You’ve got yourself a praiseworthy American hero. Weaver 
(1985) describes this very phenomenon, where God terms are linked to political trends in 
such a way that one ends up going to war for apple pie.  
No one would suggest that Skutnik ought to be painted as a villain, but Skutnik’s 
irreproachable status is political. He is made uncontroversial, and rendered neutral, which 
for Foucault is a precarious position. Condit (1985) argued that the epideictic is marked 
by its assignment of praise and blame, its “colorful style” and most importantly, its 
“noncontroversiality” (Condit, 1985, p. 291). The epideictic form is notable not only for 
what it is but for what it is politically capable of. Murphy (2003) writes that the 
epideictic emerges in times of “communal rupture” and “brings particular values to life” 
(p. 610). In these moments, the epideictic valorizes heroes, “providing consolation to the 
living but dramatizing models of arête worthy of imitation in the present” (Vivian, 2006, 
p. 2). In this way, it is descriptive of a political moment, constitutive of that moment’s 
importance, and highly prescriptive to the public. When it emerges from a position of 
power, the epideictic voice re-establishes order and social cohesion by reminding (or 
retrospectively creating a memory) of how good citizens ought to be and become worthy 
of praise. This was Reagan’s primary epideictic mechanism. Reagan valorized a new kind 
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of American hero, a self-propelled private citizen, a spontaneous volunteer who is 
unstained by politics, and therefore perfect for political deployment.  
Reagan’s use of epideictic rhetoric has been discussed in relation to national crisis 
(Dow, 1989), but not in relation to welfare and poverty politics. Reagan’s rhetorical 
treatment of welfare and anti-poverty work is ripe for epideictic inquiry, especially in 
light of Vivian’s (2006) formulation of “the neoliberal epideictic.” Vivian explains, 
“neoliberal epideictic invests an ironically apolitical vocabulary of democratic excellence 
with the authority of tradition, prosperity, and even sacred prophesy” (Vivian, 2006, p. 
4). The “neoliberal epideictic consequently amounts to a willful, and therefore dangerous, 
aestheticization of politics” (Vivian, 2006, p. 19). Vivian’s description implies that there 
are more than just descriptive questions at play and that there are material and political 
implications at stake when neoliberal epideictic is deployed.  
The American public is handed “warm,” all-American humanitarians, and their 
“cold” counterparts. It is not that Lenny Skutnik and a great number of middle school 
traffic guards are not heroic. Rather, a particular brand of humanism becomes 
characteristic of America, allowing us to dissociate from “the State’s” help and 
simultaneously associate with “the Nation’s” values. And we cannot imagine an 
alternative affect of American volunteers. The rendering of particular mechanisms as 
‘antithetical’ and ‘cold,’ brings us to the second characteristic of epideictic rhetoric. 
Blame is cast and set against the praiseworthy.  
In this case, Reagan created a dialectic of good and bad humanitarianism, patriotic 
and foolish citizenship, heroic and fair-weather volunteers. Reagan paired his praises 
with the admonition of “bad” humanitarians and “bad” humanitarianism, honorable and 
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dishonorable volunteers. And this is how the epideictic operates. Reagan’s assignment of 
blame is particularly interesting to our “problem of the present,” as he worried about the 
haphazard humanitarian. In a 1964 speech, Reagan offered: 
There is only an up or down – [up] man’s old – old-aged dream, the ultimate in 
individual freedom consistent with law and order, or down to the ant heap of 
totalitarianism. And regardless of their sincerity, their humanitarian motives those 
who would trade our freedom for security have embarked on this downward 
course… 
Yet anytime you and I question the schemes of the do-gooder, we’re denounced 
as being against their humanitarian goals. They say we’re always ‘against’ 
something – we’re never ‘for’ anything. (Ronald Reagan, 1964) 
Reagan worries about good intentions gone astray, echoing his larger critique of the 
Democratic Party. Liberalism, for Reagan is both to blame and unaware of its faults. The 
above passage may strike us as ironic, given the thesis of this chapter -- Reagan seems to 
create space for the criticism of humanitarianism. But this is the brilliance of his 
messaging. He promotes the impeachment of the unimpeachable (care for the poor in the 
form of welfare services), and immediately instates a new untouchable trope: The 
Skutnik. The assignment of praise, the casting of blame, and the renegotiation of 
responsibility.  
The Responsibilities of the Individual 
As Reagan constructed his epideictic, he had to delegate the responsibilities of 
anti-poverty work and service provision to the poor. He had to relocate these 
responsibilities to a new, nongovernmental locus. Rather than pointing to a particular 
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agency, Reagan promoted individual forces, and isolated, solitary action. In 1979, Reagan 
offered:  
The key to restoring the health of the economy lies in cutting taxes… this does 
not mean sacrificing essential services, nor do we need to destroy the system of 
benefits, which flow to the poor, the elderly, the sick and the handicapped. We 
have long since committed ourselves, as a people, to help those among us who 
cannot take care of themselves. But the federal government has proven to be the 
costliest and most inefficient provider of such help we could possibly have. 
(Ronald Reagan, 1979) 
We can see here how Reagan is strained. Blame has been effectively assigned, but praise 
and responsibilities are unable to compensate for the “big government problems.” 
Skutnik cannot distribute welfare, so to whom does this job fall? Reagan bypassed this 
problem by focusing on citizens’ responsibilities to uphold and spread values (as opposed 
to material goods, for example): 
Together, let us make this a new beginning. Let us make a commitment to care for 
the needy; to teach our children the values and the virtue handed down to us by 
our families; to have the courage to defend those values and the willingness to 
sacrifice them. (Ronald Reagan, 1980) 
He spoke directly to the value of “voluntary service,” which is as close as he gets to 
addressing the voluntary sector without doing so directly, and the family unit is the most 
communal structure he refers to. He says in 1980, “Let us pledge to restore, in our time, 
the American spirit of voluntary service, of cooperation, of private and community 
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initiative; a spirit that flows like a deep and mighty river through the history of our 
nation.” He expresses a similar hope again in 1981: 
Our basic system is sound. We can, with compassion, continue to meet our 
responsibility to those who, through no fault of their own, need our help. We can 
meet fully the other legitimate responsibilities of government. We cannot 
continue any longer our wasteful ways at the expense of the workers of this land 
or of our children. (Ronald Reagan, 1981) 
Ultimately, Reagan’s assignment of responsibility remains vague, and highly 
individualized. It is the picture of Vivian’s neoliberal epideictic, “politically 
anesthetized” and ideologically charged. That is, Reagan’s epideictic tells us what the 
Nation is, and avoids telling us what the State does (or perhaps more importantly, what 
the State will no longer be doing).  
This non-specificity is not without its vulnerabilities. During Reagan’s first 
presidential debates, serious contradictions emerged. In response to a discussion about 
abortion, Reagan offered: 
Now I have thought for a long time that too many of our churches have been too 
reluctant to speak up in behalf of what they believe is proper in government, and 
they have been too lax in interfering in recent years with government’s invasion 
of the family itself, putting itself between parent and child… now, whether it is 
right for, on a single issue, for anyone to advocate that someone should not be 
elected or not, I won’t take a position on that. But I do believe that no one in this 
country should be denied the right to express themselves, or to even try to 
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persuade others to follow their lead. That is what elections are all about… 
(Ronald Reagan, 1980, Baltimore) 
The moderator, then, stepped in to clarify and to prompt a question that goes un-
answered. She says, “Okay. I would point out that churches are tax-exempt institutions, 
and I will repeat my question. Do you approve the Church’s action this week in Boston, 
and should a president be guided by organized religion on issues like abortion, equal 
rights and defense spending.” From there, Reagan redirected and never addressed the 
“nonprofit problem.” The contradictions of government interference and the pro-life 
politic collide with Reagan’s orientation towards individualism and the invisible 
responsibilities of a voluntary sector.  
Drawing out Implications 
When Weaver defined “ultimate terms,” he wrote, “Perhaps these observations 
will help the speaker who would speak against the stream of ‘progress’ or who, on the 
other hand, would parry some blow aimed at him through the potency of the word, to 
realize what a momentum he is opposing” (Weaver, p. 214). Pinpointing these god terms, 
the Skutnik, Reagan’s heroes, allow us to unveil them as politically non-neutral. 
Foucaultian genealogy aims itself at a similar goal, enabling us to feel those things which 
have been, as Vivian says, politically anesthetized.  
The epideictic contributes to the materialization of political realities.  Sheard’s 
(1996) examination of the epideictic calls us to: 
“reconceptualize epideictic as discourse that serves more exigent social and civic 
functions than simply celebrating, reinforcing, or reexamining values… [it] 
moves its audience toward a process of critical reflection that goes beyond 
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evaluation toward envisioning and actualizing alternative realities, possible 
worlds.”  
(Sheard, 1996, p. 787) 
Reagan’s epideictic treatment of civic volunteerism may have done exactly this, and 
enabled the actualization of a new American volunteerism that resembled private sector 
ideologies and individualism far more than its earlier incarnations. The epideictic, Sheard 
tells us, is not an inconsequential casting of praise and blame. It is politically momentous, 
and ideologically charged. 
Undergirding the power of epideictic rhetoric is the deployment of ideologically 
loaded terms.  McGee’s (1980) rendering of the ideograph, and Weaver’s (1985) 
discussion of “god terms” offer a starting point for a discussion of Reagan’s deployment 
of specific, ideologically infused terms within his epideictic. McGee (1980) developed 
the term “ideograph” to refer to a gap in existing literature. He felt that we needed to 
address the collectivity of human thought and behavior in a way that spoke both to 
rhetoric and to ideology. “They are the basic structural elements, the building blocks, of 
ideology. Thus they may be thought of as ‘ideographs,’ for, like Chinese symbols, they 
signify and ‘contain’ a unique ideological commitment” (McGee, 1980, p. 7). His 
definition enables a very particular kind of conversation about rhetoric. He explains that 
we are conditioned to vocabularies of concepts, rather than explicit beliefs, and that these 
vocabularies “function as guides, warrants, reasons, or excuses for behavior and belief” 
(McGee, p. 6). This calls us, for example, to consider how Reagan’s epideictic 
conditioned publics to specific ideological vocabularies, rather than particular beliefs, 
ways of talking about heroism and volunteers rather than beliefs about them. 
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McGee (1980) offers the example that “we make a rhetoric of war to persuade us 
of war’s necessity but then forget that it is a rhetoric (p. 6). Reagan made a rhetoric of 
heroism to persuade us of anti-poverty policies, rendering invisible that heroism is a 
rhetoric. Most importantly, for McGee, ideographs are forces that match and connect to 
other ideographs in ideograph clusters. In the context of Reagan’s rhetoric, this calls us to 
consider the relationships between such terms as “hero,” “America,” and, “volunteer” for 
example.  
Weaver (1985) writes that “[The] capacity to demand sacrifice is probably the 
surest indication of the ‘god term,’ for when a term is so sacrosanct that the material 
goods of this life must be mysteriously rendered up for it, then we feel justified in saying 
that it is in some sense ultimate” (p. 214). Presidential tributes to heroes of service and 
philanthropy surely fit this description and warrant this discussion of Reagan’s epideictic.  
An exploration into Reagan’s epideictic sets up new genealogical questions as we 
look toward the evolution of American volunteerism in the decades that separate Reagan 
from modern critiques: How is it that the tensions Reagan experiences between the value 
of individual public heroes and the responsibilities of a unified public are manifest in far 
critical rhetorics thirty years later? Most importantly, though, Reagan’s rhetorical 
strategies illustrate Sheard’s proposition. Sheard argues that epideictic is not “mere 
rhetoric” as many have implied. My point, in examining Reagan’s public addresses, is not 
to reinforce the epideictic as a “worthy” or “authentic” form of public address. I argue, 
instead, that Reagan’s epideictic contributed to the actualization of political realities in 
the twenty first century.  
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This chapter attends to a second juncture in the formation of American 
volunteerism discourses.  It explores the emergence of nonprofit watchdogging agencies; 
discourses that promoted the public proctorship of nonprofits; and the citizen surveillance 
of tax-exempt donations in the 1990s.  As this project offers a “history of ideas,” the 
tropes, ideographs and rhetorical styles traced in this chapter are closely tied to the 
themes that emerged in Chapter 3.  It also introduces new themes that are more intimately 
connected to neoliberalism as a discursive trend: the government’s outsourcing of 
responsibilities and the promotion of widely dispersed surveillance behaviors that are 
facilitated by the public and not localized within the government.   
I argue that the particular way that American volunteerism discourses were 
constructed in the 1980s enabled a way of communicating about the volunteer sector (and 
volunteers) as something to be praised and blamed in an epideictic script of proctorship.  
As Foucault wrote, “Liberalism in America is a whole way of being and thinking. It is a 
type of relation between the governors and the governed, much more than a technique of 
governors with regard to the governed” (Foucault 2008, p. 218).  In other words, the 
kinds of surveillance we imagine to take place within a neoliberal landscape are not 
imposed by the State.  Techniques of governing are more complicated, less episodic, less 
centralized, and more difficult to identify.  This chapter examines the emergence of self-
governing, non-governmental watchdog discourses that shaped constructions of 
volunteerism, both good and bad.  In addition to arguing that the formation of discourses 
in the 1980s conditioned the American public to a particular way of talking about 
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volunteerism in the 1990s, I will argue that the attacks on September 11, 2001 marked a 
distinct turning point that intensified already present themes and introduced others.   
The Epideictic Reincarnated 
 While Ronald Reagan used the epideictic form to cast praise and blame on 
independent charity and government welfare, the 1990s saw public discourse that 
assigned blame and praise to praiseworthy and blameworthy charities, and by extension, 
good and bad donors.  Newspapers covered nonprofit watchdogging agencies frequently, 
and celebrated the rise of charity surveillance.  This discourse hinges on the construction 
of several neoliberal characters, each possessing an entrepreneurial, bootstrap-slinging 
spirit reminiscent of Reagan’s heroes.   
 The first of these characters is the “wise donor” who emerges frequently in 
Guidestar advertisements and op. ed.’s alike: 
“’The wise donor is going to look into an organization before deciding to devote 
efforts to it,’ said Bennett Weiner, head of the business bureau's philanthropic 
service in Arlington, Va.  In many cases, people's time may be an even larger 
commitment than money, he said, and ‘that's all the more reason that they should 
be comfortable with the choice they have made.’” (“Level of giving climbs,” 
1997) 
The ethic of donating is driven by the independent choices of the donor.  The wise donor 
does not devote his precious resources, his personal capitol to something he has not 
thoroughly investigated.  And of course, investing his time, his body, to this effort 
represents a more intimate investment.  Research makes the donor wise.  This wise donor 
ought to “Demand detailed written descriptions of the charity's mission and spending, 
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resist overly emotional "emergency" appeals and don't commit on the spot to unfamiliar 
groups” (“Level of giving climes,” 1997).  He is driven by logic, not pathos, and only 
invests in the stable organization that does not need money immediately.   
 The wise donor can be best understood alongside his counterpart, the foolish donor 
who does not treat his donation as an investment.   
Most of the charities are legitimate. But using mail solicitations to pick your 
charities is about as smart as investing in a mutual fund because you think its 
manager has great hair. (Block, 1998) 
Rather than relying on the charity’s own advertisements, the wise donor makes use of 
objective scales for surveying and ordering the worthiness of organizations.  He ought to 
“ask for an annual report” and inquire as to “how much of each dollar it spends on 
programs, how it pursues goals” (“Level of giving climbs,” 1997).  And he is to “ask 
whether [he] is being solicited by a professional fund-raiser, and, if so, how much goes to 
that outfit and how much to the charity itself.  If doubts persist, check with the charity to 
verify the legitimacy of the solicitation” (“Level of giving climbs,” 1997).   
 Deliverables become a mechanism for “true charity.”  This mirroring of a market 
mentality, of investment and scrutiny, marks a component of neoliberalism as a 
discursive formation. 
[T]he economic grid will or should make it possible to test governmental action, 
gauge its validity, and to object to activities of the public authorities on the 
grounds of their abuses, excesses, futility, and wasteful expenditure… It involves 
scrutinizing every action of the public authorities in terms of the game of supply 
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and demand in terms of efficiency with regard to the particular elements of this 
game. (Foucault, 2008, p. 246) 
In this case, the economic standard becomes a tool for the evaluation of not only 
government action, but tax-exempt action as an extension of the State.  “You wouldn’t 
invest in a mutual fund just because it sent you a letter with a sad-eyed dog on the 
envelope,” offered the New York Times, “Yet, every holiday season, thousands of 
otherwise smart investors send money to charities based on little more than a heart-
tugging appeal” (Block 1998).  Legitimate charities are marked clearly by this kind of 
press.  Legitimate charities “will be just as happy to receive your donation tomorrow as 
today,” they will not attempt to sway you with “sob stories or other emotional appeals” 
(Paradis 1999), they do not “describe the organization in vague terms, notices that you 
have won a prize and offers to send someone over to pick up your donation right now.”  
Furthermore, the illegitimate nonprofit is elusive.  “’With homicide, you have a body, a 
victim.  Charity fraud is more of an invisible crime,’” Karl Emerson, the director of the 
PA Bureau of Charitable Organizations told The Atlanta Journal and Constitution (Carr, 
2000).  Tom Steckler, the assistant director of consumer services at the Florida 
Department of Agriculture, told The Atlanta Journal charity fraud is “a hard animal to 
capture” (Carr, 2000).   
This anxiety, surrounding charity fraud as a particularly wicked crime, is 
fascinating and points to the dispersal of these proctorship mechanisms.  The State’s 
responsibilities are clear, but as social services are made tax exempt and outsourced, the 
proctorship of these organizations becomes complicated for the neoliberal subject.  The 
result, in this case, was that the neoliberal donor feels anxiety, and feels compelled to 
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engage in surveillance himself.  The purity of charity depends on the scrutiny of the 
public by the public.  This idea is particular to American neoliberalism, as Foucault 
explains it, and the need for constant proctorship over State activity, in this case over tax-
exempt money, marks part of the transition from liberalism to neoliberalism in America.   
So it is a matter of a market economy without laissez-faire, that is to say, an active 
policy without state control.  Neoliberalism should not therefore be identified with 
laissez-faire, but rather with permanent vigilance, activity, and intervention. 
(Foucault, 2008, p. 132) 
 This turn towards vigilance (a major development since Reagan’s diagnosis that 
Americans felt unable critiquing good intentions), promoted suspicion and anxiety in the 
context of increased giving.  American media outlets whirled around the idea that charity 
giving was hot, and trust was not.  “Charitable giving is up, but giving with confidence is 
not. Americans harbor more than a grain of suspicion about the calls, mail and door-to-
door seekers wanting a piece of their philanthropic pie” (“Level of giving climbs,” 1997).  
Jon Pratt, the executive director of the Minnesota Council of Nonprofits in St. Paul told 
the St. Paul Pioneer Press that, “’Trust is down everywhere…’ public disclosure is 
‘absolutely preferable to any content regulation’ such as the government determining 
ticket prices or how much can be spent on fund-raising” (Selix 2000).  In other words, the 
public’s surveillance of charities at every turn is preferable to the State’s control over 
them.   
Some referred to a sort of vague origin of these suspicions.  One newspaper 
offered that “Ever since some folks pocketed money raised during World War I for the 
doughboys in the European trenches, charity checkers have been waving red flags over 
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suspect philanthropy, estimated by federal officials to consume $ 1.5 billion a year” 
(“Level of giving climbs,” 1997).  Of course, this origin is imagined to some extent, as 
the boom of charities, and the rise of watchdogging agencies took place in the 1990s, as 
did the burst in news coverage of good and bad charities, and good and bad charity 
“investors.”  A story emerges, though, that there is something American about this kind 
of surveillance over treasonous, philanthropy bad-guys.  Proctorship is American, 
donations are investments, and charity is not just about giving, it’s about giving that must 
be made to count.  “They say a bit of investigating before giving can be something of a 
charitable act in itself” (“Level of giving climbs,” 1997).  This new way of understanding 
investment and the work of capital is an arm of the formation of neoliberal discourse.   
In their analysis of human capital, you recall, the neo-liberals tried to explain, for 
example, how the mother-child relationship, concretely characterize by the time 
spent by the mother with the child, the quality of the care she gives, the affection 
she shows, the vigilance with which she follows its development, its education, 
and not only its scholastic but also its physical progress, the way in which she not 
only gives it food but also imparts a particular style to eating patterns, and the 
relationship she has with its eating, all constitute for the neo-liberals an 
investment which can be measured in time. (Foucault, 2008, p. 244) 
Jut as the neoliberal mother invests capital in her child with time, care, and affection, so 
too does the neoliberal patron invest capital in his charity of choice.  Care is an 
investment, charity is an investment, and it must be given a metric for evaluation.  
Furthermore, this kind of care is what makes “the experience of having money” more 
meaningful.  Having wealth and finding meaning in wealth becomes its own lifestyle.   
POLICING CHARITIES   
	  
57 
One magazine that highlighted the importance of watchdogging agencies described itself: 
“Our publication focuses on the personal side of what it's like to have more money than 
other people.  How to make the experience of having money something positive and 
meaningful.” And what appears to define the experience of having money across the 
board, even the experience of having very little disposable income, is the intense desire to 
control what happens to your donation.   
You’re all set to contribute to a charity -- let's call it Worthy Cause. But there's 
a hitch: you have heard the stories about charity administrators spending more 
money on limousines and lunches than on helping the poor. You want to insure 
your money is put to good use.  (Roberts, 1998) 
And even the watchdogging agencies themselves are hesitant to offer this feeling of 
control.  They continue to “outsource” responsibilities back to the public. 
Users of Helping.org will have to do their own research on the effectiveness and 
integrity of the charities. The site simply lists every nonprofit registered with the 
Internal Revenue Service. "We don't want to be in the vetting business.  The 
liability would be horrible.” (Henry, 1999) 
The individual becomes the vector for a culture of surveillance that is necessary and 
completely decentralized.  The watchdogs themselves are hesitant to be the locus for 
watchdogging.  Foucault refers to this shift, from a competitive “supermarket society” to 
an “enterprise society, in which “the homo economicus sought after is not the man of 
exchange or man the consumer; he is the man of enterprise and production” (Foucault, 
2008, p. 147).  The individual, within the neoliberal framework, is the locus of 
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production and the vector of power.  Power is not imposed on him by the State, the 
State’s power runs through him as a limb of the State, an arm of proctorship.  
 Donations in these years are portrayed as investments that enable the donor to 
maintain control and access transparency long after money has been given away.  
Furthermore, something is increasingly expected in return for donations.  As in the liberal 
framework, donations become a mechanism of exchange, not gift, and as in the neoliberal 
framework, the individual views the donation as an investment to be controlled and 
surveyed by the public.  The president of the American Antiquarian Society shared with 
The Sunday Telegram that “I think that, when people make a contribution to a nonprofit, 
they’re making an investment.  And just as they turn to the Web for information about 
corporations they might invest in, [Guidestar] is a useful way to get information about the 
charities they invest in” (Bodor, 1999).  Others told The Atlanta Journal that “Disclosure 
and transparency are essential to maintaining that public trust” (Carr, 2000).   
Gifts can’t exist in the neoliberal framework, as they have to be filtered through 
the “enterprise” understanding of what it is to be a citizen.  Not surprisingly, it is in these 
years that donations in the form of “adoption” become particularly popular.  “Charity 
becomes less a gift than a transaction” (Leland, 2000). Mason Weinrich, the executive 
director of the Whale Center of New England, told the New York Times that, at “the 
nation's first adopt-a-whale programs… potential adopters play favorites. Baby whales, 
for example, draw swarms of adoptive parents.  ‘Mature males tend to be adopted the 
least.’ The program uses donations to study all the whales and their habitat, but that 
doesn't mean that some whales don't get their feelings hurt” (Leland, 2000).  We see in 
this trend, the emergence and intensification of the homo economicus as an entrepreneur 
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of philanthropy, a patron of investment.  Philanthropists were encouraged to adopt 
everything from baby whales to rare manuscripts.  The Times said, “As the literature 
promises, ‘An artifact's adopter becomes as important to a piece as does a parent to a 
child.’ Unlike charities that use your donations for things like postage or office supplies, 
adoption charities promise to love you back” (Leland, 2000).  The adoption format offers 
a win-win.  The donor is guaranteed not to fund those shameful administrative costs 
(after all, what legitimate nonprofit uses pens?), and they engage in an affective 
enterprise.  They produce a relationship of patronage.    
Debra Snider, the communications director at Guidestar told The New York Times 
that “recent scandals involving the United Way of America and other charities, potential 
benefactors [have become] wary of giving money to nebulous causes, where it might be 
used up in overhead and staff salaries.  ‘They want to know exactly what their money is 
being used for. People would rather buy a cow than give $100 to relieve third-world 
hunger” (Leland, 2000).  This desire for the “feeling” of doing good, the relief associated 
with knowing exactly where one’s donation goes, is akin to these “warm moral and 
cultural values” Foucault describes that soften the coldness of enterprise” (Foucault, 
2008, p. 242). 
Foucault explains that, “In neoliberalism – and it does not hide from this; it 
proclaims it… homo economicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself… being 
for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the 
source of [his] earnings” (Foucault, 2008, p. 226).  The neoliberal philanthropist, then, 
requires strategies for “maximizing good.”  It’s neoliberal biopolitics at its height. 
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If you've noticed an increase in the number of solicitations from charities in your 
mailbox, you're not alone. We're gearing up for the time of giving. Non-profit 
organizations and causes, most worthy, some not, are hoping to benefit from your 
spirit of generosity. Making donations is a good thing; just be sure your dollars 
are being put to maximum good use. Do the following before you whip out your 
checkbook or reach for your wallet… (Paradis, 1999) 
The decision to give circulated not around the worthiness of the issue, but the question of 
the decade: “Will my money be wasted or well spent?” (Johnston, 2000).  The desire for 
one’s control over one’s money is ever-present, and these attempts at control promote a 
second desire for transparency.   
Transparency, in turn, becomes a feature of progress. “My goal was for the public 
to be able to get that information in a minute because the more transparency charitable 
organizations have the better,” Mrs. Hodgkinson, a charity statistics expert, told The New 
York Times, “and, I believe, transparency will result in more contributions.”  Daniel 
Langan, the director of public information at the National Charities Information Bureau 
offered a similar sentiment to The Washington Post: “Anything that makes for a better-
informed contributor is excellent" (Henry, 1999).  It’s clear that information is power. 
 While the desire for transparency is produced and reproduced by so many 
neoliberal “enterprises,” it does seem to have an origin, or at least a catalyst that set the 
epideictic train back into motion.  “The cost of exposing charity finances to widespread 
scrutiny is being financed by charities themselves – notably the Ford, Kellogg, and 
Mellon foundations – and [Guidestar] is operated by another charity, Philanthropic 
Research Inc. of Williamsburg, VA” (Johnston, 1999).   
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The Ford, Rockefeller Brothers Fund and other foundations have made grants to 
Philanthropic Research to have each line on each Form 990 keypunched into a 
data base. Philanthropic Research must raise $2 million a year to continue the data 
entry until the I.R.S. accepts electronically filed reports from the charities, now 
scheduled for 2007. (Johnston, 1999) 
We are faced with an absolutely bizarre set of contradictions here.  First, we learn that at 
its outset, the “transparency” project required $2 million a year in data management 
costs, which would be provided by tax-exempt donations from registered nonprofit 
foundations, and that this project was designed to alert the public to nonprofits that spent 
too much money on administrative needs.  Second, the transparency movement was 
fueled by four of the largest, wealthiest, and most powerful philanthropy giants in the 
country.  These foundations have no need to pay board members due to their 
extraordinary wealth and influence, a very small percentage of their operating budget 
would cover massive administrative costs, including those required to track progress, 
trace deliverables, and advertise this information to the public.  We must ask, at this 
point, a very important genealogical question: At this juncture, who stood to benefit from 
nonprofit transparency?  
 All of these changes are presented under the banner message that they are 
indicative of national progress, that the outsourcing of proctorship represents a changing 
landscape of humanitarianism, and that nonprofits are the future in the age of a shrinking 
federal government.  “We’re riding a monumental interest in the subject of philanthropy 
and giving back,” Randall Jones, the chief executive of Capital Publishing told The New 
York Times (Pogrebin, 1997).  "’People are looking more to philanthropic sources for 
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new ideas and leadership in a period when government is shrinking,’ said Susan Vail 
Berresford, the president of the Ford Foundation’” (Pogrebin, 1997).  Government was 
out, and nonprofits were in.  Furthermore, many offered this as a sort of concession that 
the government would be incapable of policing the nonprofit sector anyway: 
‘Congress for some time has viewed the 990 and public access to the 990 as an 
important compliance tool almost independent of the IRS,’ said Marcus Owens, 
who recently left the IRS as director of the Exempt Organizations Division in 
Washington, D.C. ‘It's a tacit recognition that the IRS will never be able to review 
all tax-exempt organizations.’ The government considers public scrutiny a part of 
the privilege of not having to pay taxes. Tax-exempt groups that regularly bring in 
$25,000 or more per year are required to file 990s. If a nonprofit refuses to give 
out a 990, it faces federal penalties. (Selix, 2000) 
The publication of nonprofit tax returns online was referred to as “by far, the most 
important development ever in making charities accountable and making their finances 
transparent,” by Virginia Hodgkinson, a founder of the National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (Johnston, 1999).  The President of Philanthropic Research told The New York 
Times that “We are on the verge of a whole new era of nonprofit accountability.  The 990 
will move rapidly from being this obscure, obnoxious reporting document to something 
informative and acceptable and transform itself into a useful document" (Johnston, 1999).  
It becomes clear that the landscape of service provision had shifted dramatically.  "’There 
is certainly an expectation that the genie is out of the bottle…’ Instead of treating the 990 
as a document that must be filled out and filed, many nonprofit groups are now aware 
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that their reports will be studied by the public and by charity watchdogs” (Johnston, 
2000). 
Discourses of American charity were dominated in the 1990s by this very 
particular way of talking about nonprofits.  These discourses were, not coincidentally, in 
the form of the epideictic and overlapped frequently with neoliberal discursive 
formations.  They represent an understanding of the nonprofit sector as something subject 
to praise and blame, and more importantly, subject to scrutiny.  Furthermore, they display 
the understanding that this scrutiny ought to be the responsibility of the individual, rather 
than the State.  These patterns of surveillance point to a Foucaultian understanding of 
neoliberal power, where governmentality is not imposed on the public by the 
government.  Governing is nuanced, discursive, non-episodic, non-localized, and 
somewhat elusive. Above all, we can see how these non-localized surveillance discourses 
echo the epideictic rhetoric that emerged the decade before.  The emergence of Guidestar, 
the popularity of charity watchdogging agencies, and the presence of surveillance 
discourses in the 90s all lead up to another juncture.  American discourses of nonprofit 
policing changed dramatically following the attacks on September 11, 2001.  This 
juncture yielded the intensification of existing patterns, and introduced entirely new ways 
of communicating about American volunteerism. 
The Post-9/11 Landscape 
 The attacks on September 11, 1991 recolored every corner of American 
politics, and discourses of American volunteerism were not immune to these changes.  
The most immediate impact that 9/11 had on the volunteer sector was that Americans 
rushed to make donations in every form.  “Americans responded to the terror by giving 
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frantically: their blood, their millions, their pocket change. The disaster triggered a 
staggering response that has overwhelmed non-profit agencies” (Boudreau, 2001a).  
Each citizen stepped up to the plate, from corporate barons to the poorest of folks.  
“Chief executives are reaching into corporate coffers. Children are breaking open 
piggy banks. And the Internet is demonstrating its capabilities as a rapid-response 
conduit for philanthropy in a way never before seen” (Boudreau, 2001b).  Americans 
mobilized to “pour money at unprecedented rates into an array of charitable funds” 
(Salmon, 2001), and as several news outlets were quick to point out, Americans had 
“opened their hearts and their wallets after the terrorist attacks on the East Coast” 
(Boyd, 2001).  It was estimated that over 70% of Americans were prompted by 
September 11th to give money, blood or time.  “58% made a financial contribution; 
13% gave blood; 11% donated their time and; 73% plan to donate as much or more as 
they usually give to other charities” (Block, 2001).  These donations of time, money, 
and blood changed the landscape of charity in many ways, and the anxieties associated 
with the attacks promoted additional stress to the nonprofit sector.   
 In the same newspapers that covered nonprofit surveillance, existing patterns 
intensified.  Concern for nonprofit fraud became more severe, and all of a sudden, 
there was a fear that a super-villain was among us, attempting to rob the most giving 
among us.  The Washington Post wrote, “The river of cash is raising some concerns, 
however. Donors face a confusing assortment of funds, including some that have 
formed in just the last week, after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks that killed thousands. As 
a result, the potential for fraud or mismanagement is high, consumer groups say” 
(Salmon, 2001).  The American turn towards post-terrorism charity was yet another 
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vulnerability.  Bennet Weiner, the COO for Better Business Bureau’s Wise Giving 
Alliance told USA Today that “Unscrupulous and questionable charities tend to emerge 
whenever a crisis occurs. But this time, givers may be particularly vulnerable…Many 
of these problems have happened in the past, but I think the attention to charitable need 
is magnified because of the intensity of the disaster” (Block, 2001).  Reminders about 
fraud and checklists outlining what a legitimate charity looks like became more 
frequent, and scams were called “particularly heartless” in almost every way 
imaginable. 
What was even more complicated was that charities could not use all of this 
money to respond to immediate needs that were not yet clear.  Money could not heal 
the national consciousness, yet there was an extraordinary amount of money pouring 
in.  Some nonprofits, particularly the American Red Cross had no choice but to invest 
some of the donations in infrastructure: refrigerators for blood banks being the most 
well-documented.  This infuriated donors.  Guidestar’s communications director, 
Suzanne Coffman, offered, “Since 9-11, I've seen many more people asking, 'How can 
I tell if they're using my contribution wisely?'” The Telegraph Herald went on to 
explain that, "The American Red Cross was criticized for directing some Sept. 11 
donations to other purposes, and subsequently overhauled its disaster fund-raising 
policies” (Crary, 2002).  Somehow, the post-9/11 anxieties collided with the neoliberal 
understanding of charity as an investment to promote hyper-scrutiny and an intensified 
desire for control over one’s donations. 
This desire for increased control took full form after the 9/11 shift.  Media 
outlets published “control” language frequently.  One business owner told The San 
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Jose Mercury News "’If every business could send in $100, imagine the impact we 
could have,’ … before choking up. ‘It is a way of taking action at a time when we feel 
so powerless’" (Boudreau, 2001).  Another business owner offered, "I gave what I 
could give now… If I can't be in New York helping, at least I can donate funds" 
(Boudreau, 2001).  9/11 struck the national consciousness, and revitalized a sense of 
intensified civic duty.   Those who could lend a hand did so, and those too far to lend a 
hand lent a buck.  A spokeswoman for Freddie Mac told The Washington Post, “It's a 
national tragedy, and we're a large corporation that feels like we have a civic duty to be 
part of this” (Salmon, 2001).  Freddie Mac pledged $10 million in 9/11 response, the 
largest donation they’d ever offered a single cause.  Further, the attacks revitalized a 
discussion of the humanitarian American spirit. 
That spirit has been abundantly evident in this country's response to the Sept. 
11 terrorist attacks. Blood donations have soared. Companies have offered 
supplies and money to the rescue and recovery efforts. And throughout the 
country, ordinary Americans are opening their hearts and their wallets to 
charitable relief funds. (Block, 2001) 
Ordinary Americans are once again featured as a focal point of charity, producing and 
investing in causes even if one has very little.   
The American public had experienced a dramatic and sudden “loss of control,” 
and there was a very palpable need for citizens to regain their grip on their citizenry, 
which was exhibited in American media.  This was exacerbated when Americans (and 
media representatives) felt their donations had not been used as they had imagined:  
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Money [donors] thought was going directly to the victims or families of victims 
in the World Trade Center, Pentagon and Pennsylvania crashes is instead being 
diverted to charitable agencies' infrastructure and technology needs and 
administrative costs, as well as to relief workers. The American Red Cross, for 
instance, announced that $105 million of the agency's Liberty Disaster Fund 
would go to tolerance, grieving and healing programs, infrastructure upgrades 
and technological improvements for blood storage." Preparedness is a big part 
of what we do," said Audrey Kintzi, chief development officer of the St. Paul 
American Red Cross, and these donations help fund that as well as provide 
direct service in disaster areas.  (Boyd, 2001) 
People felt that they had lost control twice over.  Having hoped that at least, in the 
context of the panic and the fear, their donations would create a relationship between 
those who were affected and those who were most intimately affected, people were 
horrified to find out how impersonal their donations really were.  "I want to make sure 
there is enough money for the kids -- not for buying freezers for blood," Maria Ortega 
of Woodbury, who gave to the Red Cross Liberty fund, told the Saint Paul Pioneer 
Press (53).  Charitable and emergency response organizations were forced to respond 
to allegations that donations were being mishandled and misappropriated.  
“Sometimes…disaster money goes for related expenses. During the 1997 floods in the 
Grand Forks, N.D., area, the organization had to buy forklifts to transport donated food 
and other supplies. Disaster donations do not pay for salaries” (Boyd, 2001).  People 
must understand that part of a charity’s operating budget must contribute to salaries 
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and administrative costs.  They just don’t want their money to be that money.  Their 
money needs to make a special, direct impact. 
 So the media mobilized to help people navigate these additional fears and 
regain a sense of control.  They prompted: “How do you know whether your gift to a 
charity will be used as you intended?” (Johnston, 2001).  The New York Times wrote, 
“With upward of 200 organizations, many of them new, raising money in response to 
the Sept. 11 attacks, and with 1.2 million charities on the cumulative list kept by the 
Internal Revenue Service, is anyone making sure this money is not diverted to a 
different cause or to a crooked charity organizer's personal bank account?” (Johnston, 
2001).  This trust crisis was well documented, as the Brookings Institution 
demonstrated:  
In July, just 26% expressed "a lot" of confidence in consolidated appeals like 
United Way vs. 39% a year earlier.  Some givers say they're also taking a 
harder look at charities. Stephen Bloom, owner of Capcom Consulting in 
Atlanta, says he's giving only to local charities he knows well. ‘If I give to the 
United Way, it's being designated to a specific organization at which I'm 
involved,’ Bloom says. (Fogarty & Block, 2002) 
They noted also that there were other contributors to this drop-off than the news around 
Sept. 11 donations.  The same year, Catholic charities had to manage suspicions after 
the sexual abuse scandals, and “Muslim charities [were] fending off suspicions that 
they [were] tied to terrorist groups” (Fogarty & Block, 2002).  Across the board, 
though, it was determined that 2002 was a “nightmare for charities” (Fogarty & Block, 
2002).  Some of Reagan’s old tag lines re-emerged.  The Philadelphia Inquirer shared 
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that these cases are “cautionary tale[s], with a moral that we've heard before but that's 
always worth repeating: Just because someone says ‘it's for a good cause’ doesn't make 
it so” (Gelles, 2003).  People were reminded once again about resisting emotional 
appeals, and the prevalence of charity fraud (Gelles, 2003; Boudreau, 2003).  There 
was a particular concern that emerged surrounding the value of unpaid board members.  
The New York Times wrote, “experts say there is seldom any reason to pay directors on 
charity boards. The board members should also be drawn from a broad pool and not be 
closely tied to the charity's executives. Most charities list their board members on their 
letterheads, in their annual reports and on their Web sites” (Johnston, 2001).  Board 
members of even international aid organizations are expected to be so wealthy that 
they do not require salaries of their own.  This would be anti-charity.  In fact, those 
who view nonprofit work as a paid profession are at once heroicized and vilified.   
You might have expected better from the public-spirited folks in the nonprofit 
sector. But any such notion was dispelled by this week's series in The Post on 
the Nature Conservancy by Joe Stephens and David B. Ottaway. Let me state 
upfront that I don't think the Nature Conservancy's bona fides as an 
environmental organization are called into question by having corporate 
executives on its board of directors and working closely with the oil and timber 
companies…. To me, however, the most disturbing revelation of The Post's 
series was that even a large and well-respected nonprofit -- a pioneer in 
adopting corporate best practices -- turns out to be no more open or transparent 
than most money-grubbing corporations. (Pearlstein, 2003) 
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One chief executive, Jerry Doyle, told The San Jose Mercury News, “We expect our 
board members to give us money, we don't give them money" (Nalder & Boudreau, 
2003).  People rejected the idea that service provision was a form of work that 
deserved pay, and the idea that the people filling these positions might be a part of the 
communities they serve.  "There's this feeling that to get the right-stuff people you've 
got to pay them," said Pablo Eisenberg, of the Georgetown University Public Policy 
Institute to The San Jose Mercury News. "That's absolutely ridiculous. I can get you 
thousands of really good board members who will do it for nothing" (Nalder & 
Boudreau, 2003). 
 News outlets offered old tried and true suggestions as well as more nuanced 
recommendations for nonprofit analysis.  It was observed that by this time, "Many 
more people are paying more attention to the inner workings of charities” (Boudreau, 
2002).  With this belief came a call for more than the analysis of nonprofits financial 
statements. "Looking at a non-profit's financials is not the only way to assess its 
effectiveness," she said. "It doesn't tell you anything about the quality of leadership of 
the organization. It doesn't tell you about how effective its programs are" (Boudreau, 
2002).  There were still concerns about “a serious lack of oversight in the nonprofit 
sector” (Pearlstein, 2003).  Philanthropy is presented, at once, as “a very personal 
decision” (Ballard, 2002), and something subject to extreme, nuanced public scrutiny.   
It is hardly realistic to expect nonprofits to come clean about their screw-ups if 
the reward for their candor is likely to be public vilification and an immediate 
cutoff of funding. Establishing a culture of candor… will require a culture of 
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tolerance for reasonable risk-taking and the occasional, well-intentioned failure. 
(Pearlstein, 2003) 
And all at the same time, charity remains an investment.  “As any legitimate fund-raiser 
will tell you, you have to spend money to raise money. But just as consumers want to 
make sure they get the best value for the dollars, contributors typically want the best bang 
for their bucks” (Gelles, 2003). 
Conclusions 
 
 The 1990s saw the emergence of a very particular way of talking about 
nonprofits, which was intensified after the attacks on September 11, 2001.  These 
discourses circulated around the assignment of praise and blame, and the behavior of the 
neoliberal subject-surveyor.  These conversations display the understanding that 
nonprofit policing is a worthy public responsibility and a part of the enactment of 
American citizenship.  Furthermore, these non-localized surveillance discourses echo the 
epideictic rhetoric that emerged the decade before.  The attacks on September 11, 1991 
and the resulting shifts in American charities spawned more changes. These donations of 
time, money, and blood changed the landscape of charity in many ways, and the anxieties 
associated with the attacks promoted additional change.   
 
  





















































The Contemporary Juncture 
Contemporary discourses surrounding “the nonprofit” include rhetorics of 
promotion, prescription and resistance, which are often paradoxical.  At times, the 
nonprofit sector is celebrated, upheld as a great solution to American social problems and 
as the centerpiece of humanitarianism.  Today’s nonprofit sector is larger in revenue and 
in number of registered organizations than it has been in history.  Some players I discuss 
in this chapter see this as a major triumph and an indication that the sector should take on 
more responsibilities in American service provision.  At the same time, American media 
outlets discuss and debate volunteerism in ways that renegotiate the relationship between 
nonprofits, the public, and the private sector.  Others paint the contemporary nonprofit in 
a kind of crisis, along with the private sector, in post-recession years.  These discussions 
point to many of the tensions examined throughout this project, but they also represent a 
turn to more explicit, mainstream examinations of the problems alongside “the 
nonprofit’s” potential.  Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 examined the tensions that emerged as 
the nonprofit sector was presented as a proxy-government and as a market bureaucracy.  
This chapter shows that these tensions crystalized during the millennium, and took hold 
in calls for the dramatic renegotiation of policy, and the reallocation of responsibilities 
among the State, the Market, and the nonprofit sector. 
In this chapter, I examine a contemporary discourse, which contains both 
dominant and resistant rhetorics associated with “the nonprofit.”  Resistant discourses 
present a paradoxical picture of a nonprofit sector positioned unstably between the State 
and the Market, awkwardly answering to two masters; they present political action as 
incompatible with contemporary models of service provision; they present the nonprofit 
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sector as a tool of profit for a white wealthy class; and they offer suggestions for new 
forms of nonprofit accountability.  Each of these resistant conversations calls in some 
way, for some degree of “de-nonprofitization,” a dramatic scaling back in the growth and 
breadth of the nonprofit sector.  
What is striking about the grassroots calls for de-nonprofitization is that they 
employ some very powerful rhetorical strategies, namely the use of the logos appeals and 
perspectives by incongruity, even deploying the epideictic.  Players in these 
conversations at times make use of strategies similar to those used in mainstream 
rhetoric: the presentation of complicated structural constraints and the assignment of 
praise, blame and responsibility.  They also promote the picture of incongruity in their 
portrayal of wealth, control and whiteness.  These competing rhetorics can be understood 
in Foucaultian terms as a juncture, where dominant and subjugated discourses “face off,” 
until one is successfully written into history.   
In this chapter, I compare the rhetorical strategies of “de-nonprofitizers” to the 
rhetorical strategies of nonprofit promoters, and I examine a question that is particularly 
relevant to grassroots activists: how do the rhetorical strategies of de-nonprofitization 
advocates differ from those promoting and designing the sector’s growth and how might 
activists learn from these distinctions?  In other words, what, rhetorically, is giving 
mainstream rhetorics a head up over resistant rhetorics at this contemporary juncture? 
Appealing to Logic: The Nonprofit’s Tenuous, Depoliticized Position 
 
Dylan Rodriguez famously named the “nonprofit industrial complex” in an 
anthology published by INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence in 2007.  Rodriguez 
offers: 
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More insidious than the raw structural constrains exerted by the 
foundation/state/non-profit nexus is the way in which this new industry grounds 
an epistemology – literally, a way of knowing social change and resistance praxis 
– that is difficult to escape or rupture.  (Rodriguez, 2007, p. 31) 
INCITE!’s anthology presents a series of essays that examine the contemporary 
paradoxes of the nonprofit sector, as they are understood by activist scholars and leaders 
in the feminist, anti-violence, anti-racism, anti-incarceration, and queer power 
movements.  Rodriguez portrays a nonprofit industrial complex that is epistemic, a way 
of knowing what service and change look like in America, and his description invites 
rhetorical inquiry.  
Ruth Wilson Gilmore, another contributor to the volume and founding member of 
Critical Resistance, advances that the grassroots nonprofit organization abides “in the 
shadow of the shadow state” (Gilmore, 2007, p. 47). She writes,  
They are not direct service providers but often work with clients of such 
organizations as well as with the providers themselves. They generally are not 
recipients of public funds although occasionally they get government contracts to 
do work in jails or shelters or other institutions. [...] The government is often the 
object of their advocacy and their antagonisms [...] But the real focus of their 
energies is ordinary people whom they wish fervently to organize against their 
own abandonment.  (Gilmore, 2007, p. 47)  
The position of tension between the public and the State is Gilmore’s concern, as it 
creates multiple, vague channels of accountability and displaces the State as a locus of 
responsibility.   The nonprofit sector has, as Gilmore suggested, opened up a bizarre third 
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sector that is neither public nor private but somehow indebted to both.  Her rhetorical 
choices are of particular relevance to this project, as she contributes to a broader rhetoric 
of resistance.  Gilmore appeals to fact, to the way things are structured.  She has 
beautifully excavated these structures looking for contradictions, points of contention, 
and places where unproductive tensions are produced in the grassroots.  She ultimately 
produces her argument by building and presenting causes, causation, and implications.   
Joseph (2007) writes, “Nonprofits mobilize for capital – but not only for capital – 
subjectivities that are non (only) of it – are in fact its absent center – and yet set in 
motion” (Joseph, 2007, p. 118).  Many of the INCITE! contributors express a similar 
concern that this untenable positioning of the nonprofit sector and the State promotes a 
schism between service provision and political change-making.  Mananzala (2008) offers, 
“By ameliorating some of the worst effects of capitalist maldistribution, then, [nonprofit] 
services became part of maintaining the social order, in part because they primarily 
operate through a depoliticizing charity framework rather than a social change model” (p. 
56).  As the public becomes dependent on the sector, and the sector becomes an object of 
surveillance, it is forced into deliverable, short-term quota models, and disabled from 
political work.  This criticism is particularly interesting giving the mainstream push for 
nonprofits to become politicized in order to advocate for the nonprofit sector itself, rather 
that to “selfishly” advocate for their individual interests.  Mananzala, Joseph, and 
Gilmore each offer an explicit discussion of the nonprofit as it navigates “tenuous 
positions” in American political infrastructure.  These contributors provide a framework 
for understanding the grassroots perspective on contemporary nonprofit tensions.  They 
also offer a platform for understanding the tensions behind the strategic, rhetorical 
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choices made by the other contributors in the volume.  These writers trace timelines and 
cause-effect relationships.  Because the nonprofit is situated here, it is constrained in this 
way.  Because the nonprofit reports to this sector in this way, it experiences these 
limitations.  These activist-scholars, Mananzala, Joseph, and Gilmore, offer appeals to 
logos.  They present a series of political contradictions to make their argument that the 
nonprofit, positioned as it is, cannot function “properly” or meet the needs of their 
constituents and clientele.   
Perspective by Incongruity: The Nonprofit as Profit-Protection 
Some go as far as to present the paradox that the nonprofit is not, non-profit at all.  
At the center of de-nonprofitization politics is the argument that foundations and 
nonprofits promote the movement of white capital and the control of “stolen” money by 
managing tax-exempt money.  As Jones de Almeida (2008, p. 186) explains,  
We depend on and report to foundations whose monies are a direct product of the 
massive profit of global corporations. They give us an insignificant percentage of 
the profits they make at the expense of millions of people struggling against the 
same oppression we claim to fight against in our statements of purpose.  (Jones de 
Almeida, 2007, p. 186) 
Gilmore offers a similar concern, calling foundations “repositories of twice-stolen 
wealth.” She describes, “a profit sheltered from taxes – that can be retrieved by those 
who stole it at the opera or the museum, at Harvard or a fine medical facility” (p. 46).  
The ability for the wealthy to “hide” money in pockets of tax exemption is also a theme 
in these conversations.  Ahn (2008), in particular, points to a series of studies that display 
some of the incongruities of charity: 
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A 1999 study commissioned by the Council on Foundations found that from 1950 
to 1998, foundations could have paid 6.5 percent annually and still would have 
grown their assets by 24 percent. A 2001 Harvard University study showed that 
from 1972 to 1996, the 200 largest foundations yielded an average return of 7.62 
percent annually on their investment returns while paying out an average of 4.97 
percent. At a 2003 meeting of the Northern California Grantmakers, US 
Bancorp’s Piper Jaffrey presented findings which showed that an investment 
portfolio comprising 70 percent equity stocks and 30 percent government bonds 
earned an inflation-adjusted return of nearly 8 percent from January 1980 through 
December 2002. In other words, foundations are making money. (Ahn, 2007, p. 
67) 
On the other side of this coin, of course, Ahn noticed the opposite patterns crystalizing in 
the reception of grants. “In 2002, less than 2% of foundation grant money was designated 
for Black and African American applicants and programs, 1% was designated for 
Latina/os, less than 3% for disabled people, 1% for homeless people, 0.1% for single 
parents, and 0.1% for gay and lesbian people” (Ahn, 2007, p. 68).   For these activist 
writers, blame falls to the wealthy and their continued control over tax-exempt money 
with limited oversight.  As Gilmore (2007) explains, “The shadow state, then, is real but 
without significant political clout, forbidden by law to advocate for systemic change, and 
bound by public rules and non-profit charters to stick to its mission or get out of business 
and suffer legal consequences if it strays along the way” (Gilmore, 2007, p. 46).   
The epideictic is to some degree employed, in that praise and blame are assigned 
(respectively) to grassroots activists and wealthy foundations, but it is not presented 
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alongside a particular set of values (as it was by Reagan and so many nonprofit 
watchdogging advocates).  
 The INCITE! contributors (Ahn especially) make use of what Burke called 
“perspective by incongruity.”  Burke attends specifically to, “the kinds of hermeticism, or 
stylistic mercureality, that are got by the merging of categories once felt to be mutually 
exclusive. This is the realm of ‘gargoyles’” (Burke, 1984, p. 69).  Gilmore (2007) and 
Ahn (2007) each enact perspective by incongruity by positioning nonprofits as a tool for 
profit production and profit protection, offering explicitly contradictory ideas as 
intrinsically connected.   This powerful technique quickly and succinctly unveils the 
contradictions that Gilmore, Mananzala, and Joseph examine through extended argument.  
It is a further (faster) attempt at an appeal to logic, an attempt to unveil to the basic 
structural contradictions and structural constraints of existing infrastructure.   
 Ahn takes another important step, bridging perspective by incongruity with 
elements of the epideictic form.  Ahn calls for the kind of oversight that keeps the 
wealthy accountable for their tax exemption.  Tax exempt nonprofits, Ahn says, should 
be understood “as a target for accountability, just as we might organize to hold 
corporations or the state accountable to the public good” specifically because of this 
removal of funds from public reserves and the consequent misuse of “charity money” on 
the part of the wealthy (Smith, 2007, p. 9).  For Ahn, tax-exempt money doesn’t really 
belong to the wealthy at all.   She refers to it as “exploited wealth” that ought to be 
“public money” (Ahn, 2007, p. 74).  “Foundations are created not only from wealth that 
was made off the backs of hardworking people, but from a social compact they accepted 
as a result of major tax benefits their donors received. Individuals who have dedicated 
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their lives to working for social and economic justice need a major paradigm shift” (Ahn, 
2007, p. 74).  Allen (2007) made a similar argument in the 1980s about the dangers of 
white money influencing the flow of the civil rights movement.  Allen (whose work is 
highlighted in INCITE!’s volume) believed that mechanisms of monetary control (at 
best) condemned much of the civil rights movement to the reformist “desire to become 
brokers between the white ruler and the black ruled” (Allen, 2007, p. 62).  Allen explains, 
“what [...] the cultural nationalists seek is not an end to oppression, but the transfer of the 
oppressive apparatus into their own hands” (Allen, 2007, p. 62). King and Osayande go 
even further to argue “for their brokering efforts, white-led organizations have been able 
to materially benefit as they garner and maintain control of the social justice movements 
that disproportionately impact and affect the lived reality of people of color” (King & 
Osayande, 2007, p. 81).  These accounts display the anxiety that grassroots organizers 
have had to manage as a result of the investment mentality of the neoliberal donor.  The 
donor who is conditioned to control his/her wealth through his/her investment-donations 
forecloses on the recipient’s autonomy.  And this argument, this counter-rhetoric, is 
presented in terms of its incongruities: profit emerging from nonprofit “investment,” 
maintaining and relinquishing control simultaneously in charity. Incongruity becomes a 
powerful rhetorical tool, upon which much of the counter-rhetoric depends. 
These activists also expressed tensions in the grassroots that are the result of the 
blurred relationship between the independent sector and the State.  Rojas (2007) shares, 
“More than once, compass from Latin America have asked me: Why are you getting a 
permit from the police to protest police brutality? Why are you being paid to do 
organizing? Why are people’ s movements based in non- profit offices?” (Rojas, 2007, p. 
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198).  These tensions are more than palpable at the grassroots level.  They are massively 
paradoxical and at times, completely debilitating.  Again, grassroots activists rely on 
incongruity to present the illogicality of nonprofit politics.  Asking the police to protest 
police brutality offers a perfect example. Rojas even reiterates the sentiments of a Latin 
American audience to make visible what might not be contradictory to an American 
audience right away.  Rojas is all but shouting, “This doesn’t make any sense!”   
In particular, the market mentality of the nonprofit sector is offered as an 
overwhelming incongruity for grassroots activists.  King and Osayande (2007) explain 
that,  
The non-profit model makes it easier for young economically privileged people 
coming out of college to start a non-profit than to engage in long-term established 
movements; the model is obsessed with institution building rather than 
organizing; and it forces social justice activists to become more accountable to 
funders than to our communities. (King & Osayande, 2007, p. 83) 
Perez echoes these concerns. “Foundations are ultimately interested in the packaging and 
production of success stories, measurable outcomes, and the use of infrastructure and 
capacity building systems” (Perez, 2007, p. 92). He explains also that the “grant market” 
interrupts an organizations’ ability to build coalitions because of the competitive climate 
that pits them against one another (Perez, 2007, p. 93).  The result of this marketization 
for organizations with both social service and social change goals is grim.  
“[O]rganizations, in order to protect their non-profit status and marketability to liberal 
foundations, actively self-police against members’ deviations from their essentially 
reformist agendas while continuing to appropriate the language and imagery of historical 
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revolutionaries” (Rodriguez, 2007, p. 34).  And what’s more, they offer that grant writing 
and deliverable maintenance becomes time consuming, cutting into the work itself:   
Applying for grants from foundations resulted in our taking on additional work as 
required by guidelines that were not always reflective of our own internal 
priorities [...] it also required us to overextend ourselves to do both the work we 
had envisioned and the work we had assumed now as grantees.  (Perez, 2007, p. 
92) 
Causation emerges again as a centerpiece of a logos appeal.  Particular conditions induce 
particular outcomes, which cause the grassroots to suffocate.  As Mananzala explains, 
there is particular concern within these grassroots organizations that these dynamics are 
destructive to anti-oppressive work. “For people who hold self-determination as a goal of 
liberation struggles or who believe that people struggling under oppression possess 
unique understandings of the operations of that oppression that are not shared by others, 
this concern is especially significant” (Mananzala et al, 2007, p. 57).  The tension that 
Paul Durazo experiences in his anti-violence organization offers a perfect example of 
restricted self-determination.   
The criminalization of domestic violence created a dual advantage for the state: 
the perpetrator became the sole party responsible for violence against women 
while the state positioned itself against the perpetrator and thereby as an ally of 
battered women. Criminalization also buttressed the state’ s claim that prisons 
were the solution to domestic violence, a framework that has been proven to the 
contrary while yielding disastrous results for women of color and their 
communities. (Durazo, 2007, p. 118)  
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A resistance to market-professionalism emerges frequently within this 
conversation.  “It is very difficult, if not impossible, to maintain political integrity in 
circumstances that demand a professionalized, businesslike practice. And perhaps that is 
the point” (Perez, 2007, p. 95).  This presents two concerns for the INCITE! contributors 
– first, it complicates the integrity of the work, as Perez explains, and second, it disables 
movement-building for organizations that are social-change oriented.  Madonna 
Thunderhawk offers this perspective, “Maybe when we start paying $8 a gallon for gas, 
people can start being activists again because we won’t have a choice. Activism is tough; 
it is not for people interested in building a career” (Madonna Thunderhawk, 2007, p. 
106).  Thunderhawk is able to use incongruity to reframe what an activist is, and she is 
one of few contributors who attempt to redefine grassroots work.  Andrea Smith 
discusses the same tension, noting that “a mass movement requires the involvement of 
millions of people, most of whom cannot get paid” (Smith, 2008, p. 10).  Other 
contributors to the volume articulate their anxieties surrounding the “schism” between 
social service and social change (Durazo, 2007).  Ahn argues that the American public 
views volunteerism in two unproductive extremes, either as the culmination of random 
piecemeal efforts (that will never be as effective as a “systematic public approach to 
eliminating poverty”) or as being dependent on the generosity of a wealthy philanthropic 
class (which assumes that “foundation grants, rather than organizing [...] will lead to 
social change” (Ahn, 64). Joseph argues that volunteerism discourses aid in the 
development of “liberal subjectivity at the site of the nonprofit” (p. 113).  
These activist-scholars present a clear and united (though diverse) picture of the 
problems of the contemporary nonprofit.  Their arguments are economic, psychological, 
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sociological, and discursive, but consistently driven by logos appeals and the unveiling of 
incongruities.  It was Dylan Rodriguez, the activist who named the nonprofit industrial 
complex, who referred to a nonprofit “etymology” that makes it difficult to critique and 
“rupture.”  While their concerns align in many ways with the tensions examined in this 
project, their critique has gone largely overlooked outside of grassroots circles.  These 
thinkers make use of well developed arguments supported by sound research.  They 
adhere to logical appeals, and the power of perspective by incongruity.  They even take 
up the assignment of praise and blame, as so many other thinkers have in reference to 
“the nonprofit.”  What separates this counter-rhetoric from both its mainstream 
counterpart and other epideictic stories I’ve examined in this project, is that it is not allied 
with any particular set of familiar values.  Praise and blame are distributed, but not by 
any particular standard (good citizenship or good business, for example). Perhaps there is 
a powerful difference between the impact of the epidiectic and the neoliberal epideictic, 
but in order to begin answering this question, we have to examine the contemporary 
neoliberal epideictic associated with “the nonprofit.”   
Mainstream Rhetoric, The Other Epideictic 
	  
Melinda Gates, one of the most powerful movers and shakers of contemporary 
American philanthropy, announced to the Council on Foreign Relations in 2008 her 
beliefs about the potential of nonprofits to align themselves with the State and the Market 
in order to address social problems: 
Only the nonprofit sector has the primary mission of serving the people who’ve 
been left out… Today… we do have a chance to harness political and market 
forces in ways that allow all three sectors to serve the neediest—even as each still 
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fulfills its separate mission, whether that is serving constituents, making profits, 
or meeting the needs of the poor. This kind of collaboration is difficult. It pushes 
all three sectors beyond their familiar routines. But it can also direct a much 
higher share of talent and energy to improving the lives of the world’s poorest 
people—and that's what I'd like to talk about today. (Melinda Gates, June 5, 2008) 
The kind of solution offered here by Melinda Gates became a fixture of nonprofit 
discourse between 2008 and 2012.  Public figures, philanthropist writers, and news 
outlets rallied around the idea that the sectors must somehow be politically re-united in 
order to address contemporary problems effectively and efficiently.  Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 examined the rhetorical blurring of the lines between the public, private, and 
independent sectors in the context of neoliberalism: the bureaucratic and marketized 
language used to describe and evaluate the nonprofit sector and State-like surveillance 
and proctorship language imposed on nonprofits, to name a couple.  Mainstream, 
contemporary conversations about the nonprofit would suggest that sector-blurring 
rhetoric is materializing into sector-blurring policy shifts driven by the neoliberal 
epideictic.  I offer here that the nonprofit epideictic has been more than just “mere 
rhetoric,” in that it has enabled contemporary policy and political tensions (just as it has 
been conditioned by policy all along).  It shows further that the renegotiations of work 
among the State, the Market and the nonprofit sector continue to be rendered apolitical, 
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The Post-Recession Nonprofit 
 The pre-Obama years and the first term of Obama’s presidency saw dramatic 
changes in the post-recession economy, the responsibilities of the public sector, the 
structures of taxation and the government’s relationship to the private sector.  Americans 
saw and experienced the impact of the government’s rollback of nonprofit and welfare 
funding, as well as the government’s sponsorship of corporate bailouts and post-recession 
support.  Among these changes, national attention was drawn to the importance of the 
nonprofit sector, partially because of the continued rollbacks of government support and 
partially because of Barak Obama’s history as a community organizer and the nonprofit 
sector’s high hopes for “one of their own” leading the nation.  On the other hand, 
excitement about having a nonprofit oriented-president was still tethered to fears 
surrounding proctorship and nonprofit accountability. 
What is most extraordinary about the 2008 campaign for the White House is that 
both candidates bring experience with the nonprofit world to the table… but the 
imbalance in the candidates’ campaign platforms suggests that that won’t happen, 
leaving critical issues such as nonprofit accountability and the relationship 
between government and charity out of the campaign debates. (Cohen, 2008, 
Chronicle of Philanthropy)  
Excitement is tempered by the lingering concern that nonprofits still require proctorship. 
This sense of kairos for nonprofits in America came enmeshed in the energy of 
what was dubbed, “Generation O,” a term that came to be used to refer both to children 
of the “00”s (millennials), and to young people who rallied around Barak Obama in ’08 
and ‘12.  Their progressive excitement became a fixture of American potential, and a way 
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to highlight the “suffering” of the sector: 
As a dreary Thanksgiving comes and goes, one answer is to mobilize Generation 
O to help the nation’s struggling nonprofit sector.  Unlike the automobile 
industry, whose representatives were ferried to Washington on private jets, the 
nonprofit industry has yet to show up at all… There is already plenty of evidence 
that the sector is suffering because of recession. (Light, 2008, Washington Post) 
During the millennial years, American media outlets presented a two-faced nonprofit 
sector – One boiling over with potential, and one in post-recession struggle, and these 
portraits were not presented as contradictory.  As nonprofits and policy makers alike 
attempted to navigate these tensions, mainstream media covered their discussion of how 
the sector’s “struggles” could be productively managed for the best.   
The weaknesses of all three sectors were frequently presented as grounds for 
productive growth and collaboration.  And the most commonly offered solution to the 
nation’s post-recession problems was that the nonprofit, private and public sectors form a 
coalition or otherwise rearrange their responsibilities.  Melinda Gates offered in 2008, for 
example: 
Once you analyze the strengths and constraints […] no sector, acting on its own, 
will likely be able to do very much for very long to change the lives of people … 
who cannot now express their needs in ways that matter to markets or that 
motivate governments. So—we face the obvious question: Can we encourage 
cooperation among the three sectors in a way that minimizes our weaknesses and 
maximizes our strengths? Can we combine the scale and resources of government 
with the self-funding qualities of business and the risk-taking approach of 
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foundations that serve the poor? (Gates foundation, Melinda, Melinda French 
Gates - Council on Foreign Relations. June 5, 2008) 
In comments like this, the rhetorical spillover between sectors materialized into an 
attempt at actual collaboration.  In the thick of the recession, advocates for a tighter 
relationship between the government and the nonprofit sector were loud, and colored by 
private sector language (maximizing strengths and minimizing weaknesses, for example).  
The Chronicle of Philanthropy in 2008 wrote, 
[The nonprofit world’s] leaders have been discussing ways to tighten the 
relationship between government and charities… some nonprofit officials are 
pressing the next president to seek to steer money to innovative programs that 
want to spread their approaches nationwide and to finance programs that train 
charities to do a better job of managing their operations.  (Eisenberg, 2008, 
Chronicle of Philanthropy) 
And this move, of course, is presented in market language.  It is presented to be logical 
that the government can aid the nonprofit in regaining control of their finance programs 
and operation management.   
The government becomes a locus of “help” for charities in these conversations, 
and this shift is typically presented as the natural compliment of the government’s 
bailouts of for-profit companies.  The idea behind this messaging strategy, of course, is 
that if for-profit corporations are entitled to government help, so too (and perhaps more 
so) are not-for-profit charities.      
Like many for-profit companies, charities are seeking help from the government, 
and they are upset that policy makers do not understand how much the recession 
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has hurt them.  Last week, nonprofit leaders representing thousands of 
organizations across the county signed on to a manifesto that calls on political 
leaders to support the work of nonprofits. (Strom, 2009, New York Times)  
These conversations mark an incredible transition.  Thirty years before, the President of 
the United States presented the government’s “help” as a nightmare scenario.  This, of 
course, is not necessarily indicative of the opinions of a divided public.  However, as I 
discussed in Chapter 4, the 1990s saw a national shift towards the idea that the nonprofit 
sector was something that needed to be surveyed and policed by the government (and the 
public), rather than something entitled to government patronage.  The failures of 
Reagan’s plan for America’s churches and volunteers to bear the weight of national 
service provision are crystalized in these tensions, as the post-recession nonprofit falls to 
crisis and calls back on the government for bailouts of their own.   
What is particularly striking, is that the kinds of “bailouts” discussed at this time 
are not financial at their core.  Rather than forgiving loans or offering monetary aids to 
struggling nonprofits, Barak Obama’s 2008 campaign promised the development of a 
government agency that would help nonprofits manage themselves more effectively and 
more efficiently.   
[Barak Obama will] create an agency within the Corporation for National and 
Community Service dedicated to building the capacity and effectiveness of the 
nonprofit sector.  The agency will be charged with: improving coordination of 
programs that support nonprofits across the federal government; fostering 
nonprofit accountability; streamlining processes for obtaining federal grants and 
contracts, and eliminating unnecessary requirements; and removing barriers for 
POLICING CHARITIES   
	  
90 
smaller nonprofits to participate in government programs. (Jacobson, 2012, 
Tampa Bay Times) 
Again, the government steps out of laissez-faire, into a management position, to proctor, 
police, consult and manage NGOs, and above all to evaluate their work with a private 
sector metric of effectiveness, capacity, and “streamlining.”  
Apolitical Politics & Selfish “Special Interests” 
 A second discourse coming from many pockets of nonprofit leadership 
accompanied these conversations about the government’s benevolent management of the 
nonprofit sector.  Nonprofit leaders, newspapers, and most consistently the Chronicle of 
Philanthropy, published articles that called for nonprofits to advocate for more than their 
own “special interests,” and for the sector itself.  In addition to the Gates’ Foundation’s 
call, 2008 saw the emergence of the V3 Primary Project for “Voice, Value and Votes.”  
This project (based out of New Hampshire) offered that “charities could cooperate to 
advocate for more than just their own causes. ‘The real strategy was, Would nonprofits in 
New Hampshire lower their kind of individual flags and stand together?’ he says.  ‘That 
was the real test’” (Perry, 2008, Chronicle of Philanthropy).  Nonprofits, in addition to 
being responsible for service provision and volunteer coordination, were now assigned a 
second set of responsibilities in the name of self-advocacy. 
Nonprofit groups must work together to get on politicians’ radar screen as 
organizations that play a major role in the national economy and help the country 
tackle its social problems… you have in every community a really robust, vibrant 
economic stimulator in the nonprofits.  How would you partner with us? (Perry, 
2008, Chronicle of Philanthropy) 
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Nonprofits are explicitly positioned in this passage as a mechanism for economic growth.  
The economic crash damaged people’s bank accounts, damaging donations, and 
weakening the nonprofit sector, And somehow, nonprofits are centered as an “economic 
stimulator” ripe for partnership.  “We not only have a right to be involved in these 
processes, but in some ways an obligation to speak for the sector and to raise the sector’s 
issues with candidates” Perry, 2008, Chronicle of Philanthropy).   
The sector, rather than the interests of the organizations become the centerpiece of 
advocacy.  Perry (2011), wrote in the Chronicle of Philanthropy about the policy 
proposals coming from the Republican party in 2011, and specifically about those budget 
cuts that would damage charitable giving to the nonprofit sector.  “For example, most 
want to end the estate tax, and remove the capital-gains tax. Both of those taxes provide 
incentives for people to give to charities as a way to lower their tax liabilities” (Perry, 
2011, Chronicle of Philanthropy).  Fears surrounding post-recession damage to the 
nonprofit sector enabled the circulation of this idea, that charities needed to advocate not 
only for their specific charities, but for the idea of charity altogether – they had to ask the 
public to give to them, but first, to give at all.  Leaders in the nonprofit sector expressed 
concern for a lack of this sector-advocacy.   
[Few nonprofits] have been advocating for tax increased that could avert cuts to 
federal funds, the second largest revenue source for nonprofits (after tuition, fees, 
and other charges charities impose.  Some nonprofit leaders say that’s a big 
mistake.  ‘Every nonprofit should be speaking out on the need for new revenue, 
and we should be opposing massive spending cuts.  We haven’t rallied around 
that one-two message,’ says Gary Bass, executive director of the Bauman 
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Foundation… ‘If you’re a local or state nonprofit, the number-one issue is 
increasing tax revenues.’ (Donovan, 2012, Chronicle of Philanthropy) 
The number one goal of nonprofits is presented in this conversation as advocacy for 
nonprofits themselves, not the specific goals of individual organizations.  And what’s 
more is that nonprofits advocating for their issue focuses rather than the nonprofit sector 
is presented as selfish.   
Nonprofit coalitions have been fighting hard to protect the charitable deduction 
despite little evidence that more than a billion dollars might be lost by the changes 
President Obama has proposed.  By contrast, leading nonprofit groups have done 
little or nothing to protect vital social and economic programs that have been put 
at great risk as Congress grapples with ways to rein in the deficit.   Many 
nonprofit coalitions seemed more concerned with their narrow self-interest and 
greed than in the national interest. (Eisenberg, 2012) 
A few really interesting anxieties are expressed in this passage.  First, there is the 
expectation that nonprofits have a responsibility to one another, and that the nonprofit 
sector has “interests” that are morally or patriotically superior to the interests of any 
individual charity.  Second, there is the assumption that national interests are hinged on 
the performance and self-advocacy of the nonprofit sector.  We can understand in a 
passage like this one the fear and tension associated with a service provision sector that is 
not tangibly accountable to itself or to the public in times of national crisis, and we might 
imagine the stress of these vague, public-drive accountability measures on the nonprofit 
world.   
 




 This examination of the contemporary juncture unearths some troubling findings 
for those advocating for any degree of de-nonprofitzation, or criticism of a neoliberal 
nonprofit structure.  The mainstream conversation continues to effectively perpetuate 
epideictic language associated with neoliberal values.  In doing so, these nonprofit 
promoters draw on the rhetorical strength of history, and effectively negotiate 
contemporary tensions.  The voices in the margins on the other hand, which contribute 
rhetoric of resistance to the contemporary discourse, have not drawn on neoliberal values 
when assigning praise and blame.  They also rely heavily on appeals to logic, to the 
development of argument, and to the presentation of incongruity.  All of these 
conversations, dominant and resistant alike, appeal in some way to the epideictic, 
creating small battles of praise and blame assignment, where competing epideictics 
compete.  In many ways, the contemporary juncture hinges on a battle between the 
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A Genealogy of “The Nonprofit” 
In this genealogy, I have examined three junctures.  In the first, Reagan’s 
discourse of the new American hero was powerful.  Coming from a powerful platform it 
conditioned a way of understanding American volunteerism as individuated, non-
governmental and heroic.  At the second juncture, the emergence of nonprofit 
watchdogging agencies conditioned a way of understanding American nonprofits as 
something that needed to be surveyed and policed by the public and the government, and 
measured on a marketized scale of efficiency and investment.  Contemporarily, we see a 
mainstream conversation that is clearly conditioned by the mainstream discourses of the 
1980s and 90s.  The nonprofit is rendered apolitical, with the exception of sector-wide 
advocacy, which is seen as heroic compared to lobbying for “special interests.”  
Additionally, we see the continued desire for nonprofits to be better proctored and better 
managed by the government.  The nonprofit, once again, becomes a fixture of blame, and 
a fixture of responsibility.  Specifically, nonprofits that advocate only for their issues and 
not for the sector more broadly become a national problem, and an economic drag.  
Further, the assignment of responsibilities shifts in the contemporary conversation in an 
important way.  The 1980s and 90s housed discourses promoting the nonprofit’s 
responsibility of previously State-facilitated services (welfare, care for the poor, care for 
the disabled, etc.).  In the contemporary conversation, the nonprofit is given the 
responsibility of recharging the economy as well.  The independent sector is handed 
responsibilities of the State and the market, and then proctored by the State on a market 
metric.  
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Combatting the Epideictic  
 The nonprofit-critical discourses that are taking place outside of the mainstream 
conversation are at times academic in style, and offer a complicated discussion of a 
matrix of power relationships.  Their accounts of tension in the grassroots show that the 
pressure of surveillance, the contradictions of charity and professionalism, and the push 
for individualism are complicating and disabling the work there.  Both the mainstream 
and marginalized discourses of “the nonprofit” point to the intensification of rhetorical 
trends tracing back to the 1980s (namely the use of the epideictic and neoliberal 
conceptions of American service).  These discourses also show that these discursive 
trends have done more than intensify; they have materialized into complicated and 
paradoxical political realities.   
 A comparison of today’s mainstream and resistant rhetorics surrounding “the 
nonprofit” unveils the nuances of the epideictic form.  It also highlights the limitations of 
“logic” for subjugated voices contesting the epideictic.  Many of the INCITE! 
contributors are the founders and leaders of powerful anti-racist and anti-violence 
organizations.  Many more hold their PhDs in the social sciences and teach at prominent 
universities.  These activist-scholars construct arguments beautifully.  Their presentation 
of logic, argument, and incongruity, however, has done little to combat an epideictic 
mainstream with historical momentum and (as Vivian suggests) neoliberal underpinnings.  
The epideictic is not mere rhetoric, and the neoliberal epideictic’s relationship to the 
nonprofit sector has been particularly powerful in subduing even the best-constructed 
appeals to logic and perspective.  I contend that the de-nonprofitization movement would 
benefit enormously from rhetorical self-examination, and that they might more 
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effectively resist their epideictic counterpart with appeals to something other than logic, 
perhaps a rhetorical form with stronger historical ties.  In this way, rhetorical history 
might be a method of inquiry and an activist toolbox.  
Arguing from the Rhetorical Past 
 
Foucault and Condit have invited genealogists and rhetorical historians to argue 
“from history” in order to de-naturalize trends that have been rendered apolitical.  Condit 
offers further that rhetoric, as the “materialization” of ideas, can serve as a focal point for 
this kind of analysis.  This project is an attempt to better understand the tensions and 
contradictions of contemporary nonprofit rhetoric from a historical position.  It attended 
to how contemporary problems have their root in history, and how their solutions might 
be embedded in history as well.  This passage from Koopman, which I cited in Chapter 2, 
becomes incredibly relevant to the conclusion of this project: 
This crucial point of Foucault’s philisophico-historical work has been so widely 
misunderstood that it is today commonplace that the central message of Foucault 
is that things could be otherwise than they are when indeed the real force of his 
thought is to show us how things might be transformed on the basis of the 
materials furnished by our contingently constructed persons (Koopman, 2013, p. 
44). 
In that vein, this project attended to three junctures.  At each juncture, it examines what 
was and what almost was.   The project engages the breadth, the size, and the scope of a 
contemporary nonprofit, which is increasingly proctored and market-managed by the 
State, private investors, and the American public.  More importantly, though, this project 
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engages the idea that there are alternatives to the contemporary model and highlights 
moments in history at which glimpses of these alternatives have cropped up.  
 Chapter 3 offered an examination of the Reagan presidency.  It argued that the 
American public was conditioned to an understanding of the American volunteer as a 
private individual, a solitary actor, and a hero.  They were specifically conditioned to a 
vocabulary of American volunteerism that echoed the neoliberal epideictic.  Praise was 
assigned to those who gave the “right” kind of help to the poor, blame was assigned to 
those who required government assistance, and the roots of poverty are rendered 
invisible.  This rhetoric accompanied Reagan’s political agenda, as he dramatically rolled 
back the government’s facilitation of welfare and outsourced responsibilities for the poor 
to churches and volunteer organizations.  What is important about this chapter from the 
genealogist’s position, is not only that Reagan’s way of talking about volunteerism 
conditioned and enabled his own political agenda.  It also becomes important that Reagan 
conditioned the American public, on a powerful national platform, to a very deliberate 
vocabulary of volunteerism that enabled a particular way of understanding what the 
nonprofit sector was in the context of American nationhood.   He offered the public a 
way of understanding charity and volunteerism as patriotic, and a way to be a neoliberal 
hero, and his vocabulary catches fire again twenty years later after the 9/11 attacks. 
 Chapter 4 examined the emergence of nonprofit watchdogging agencies in the 
1990s, and the rhetorics of surveillance, deliverability, and investment that emerged with 
them.  By exploring hundreds of newspaper articles from that decade, I analyzed a 
discourse in American media that valued the surveillance of nonprofits by the public.  
Further, I offered that this public surveillance of the nonprofit sector was made possible 
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and facilitated by government metrics like the 990 form and market measurements like 
deliverables, financial reports, unpaid board members and other measurements of 
financial stability.  This resulted in discourses of nonprofit surveillance in which rhetorics 
of the public and private sector bled over into the independent sector.  Most importantly, 
this chapter examined the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the resulting changes to 
nonprofit charity and service provision work.  At this time, the sector-blurring rhetoric 
collided with a heightened sense of nationalism, and an increased anxiety surrounding a 
loss of control.  This collision resulted in a sector-blurring discourse of nonprofits that 
involved the hyper-surveillance of nonprofits by a public making use of market and State 
metrics and the idea that this hyper-surveillance is the patriotic responsibility of 
American “donation-investors.” 
 Chapter 5 offered an examination of contemporary discourses of the nonprofit, 
informed by the previous three decades.  The genealogical assumption made here is that 
these previous discourses did not cause the contemporary conversation, but that they 
conditioned the contemporary conversation with a particular vocabulary of volunteerism, 
heroism, and nationhood.  The government rollbacks in the 80s, the rise of nonprofit 
watchdogging, and the mainstream discourses that accompanied these shifts enabled a 
neoliberal understanding what the nonprofit sector is and is capable of.  In 40 years, the 
nonprofit sector became the subject of public, private, market and State scrutiny.  In the 
same time period, the nonprofit sector became a scapegoat for the assignment of 
responsibility for all of these groups – the provision of services to the poor, the 
absorption of previously State-facilitated services, the recharging of a post-recession 
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economy, and the in-depth explication of their worth to their donors and the public at 
large. 
Directions for Further Research 
 Genealogies and rhetorical histories offer incredible strides in our analysis of 
discourses across time.  They help to unveil apparently apolitical shifts as politically 
relevant.  They unveil the power dynamics beneath what appears to be happenstance.  
And being centered on discursive junctures rather than discursive lineages, they show 
that things may have been otherwise, and how things may have been otherwise.  This 
project unveiled that discursive work went into the making of the contemporary nonprofit 
sector.  The nonprofit sector’s responsibilities, reputation, and tensions have been 
informed and conditioned by a vocabulary of neoliberalism tracing back into the 1980s.   
The most important discovery is that the American nonprofit’s position as an object of 
public surveillance, as a participant in economic revitalization, and as a lobbyist for its 
own survival and influence, is in no way arbitrary or the result of happenstance.  Despite 
their marginalization, there have been voices throughout these decades concerned about 
these tensions and this dynamic.   
 What is left to examine, is the question of why: Why has the nonprofit continued 
to be fixated in positions of extraordinary tension, despite the widespread understanding 
that its role is strained and at times paradoxical?  Finally, and above all, we ought to 
consider that radical, grassroots activist leaders are expressing particular stress under the 
existing structure, and that the nonprofit watchdogging movement that contributed to the 
marketization of American charity was funded by some of the wealthiest and powerful 
foundations in the world, namely Ford, Kellogg, and Mellon (as I discussed in Chapter 
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4).  The question left unanswered, and which I leave to another project is this: Who 
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